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Protest, Proportionality, and the Politics
of Privacy: Mediating the Tension
Between the Right of Access to Abortion
Clinics and Free Religious Expression in
Canada and the United States
RICHARD ALBERT*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Canada's determinative pronouncement on the tension
between the right of access to abortion clinics and the freedom of
religious expression, Justice Adams insightfully conceived of this
conflict as touching upon "the impact of the protest activity on
women patients and on their medical service providers in the
context of an equally full appreciation of the role of free speech in
a democratic society."' The Canadian court in Dieleman employed
its customary proportionality analysis to measure the value of
religious expression against the liberty to freely enter medical
centers, balancing "the wish of some to protest or oppose or
express dissent with the right of others to follow their own
course."2 Two months earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court had
considered a factually similar case, Madsen v. Women's Health
J.D., B.A., Yale University. Email: richard.albert@aya.yale.edu. For her
characteristically insightful comments and suggestions on a previous draft, I thank Anita
Allen, Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania. I am also
appreciative of the thoughtful criticisms and helpful comments offered by Senior
Production Editors Marie Dimacali and Claudia Natera, Technical Editor Fred Thomas,
and their colleagues on the editorial board of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review.
1. Ont. (Att'y Gen.) v. Dieleman, [1994] 20 O.R.3d 229, available at 1994 W.C.B.J.
2729, at *18 (official reporter providing abridged opinion).
2. R. v. Lewis, [1996] 39 C.R.R. (2d) 26, 45.
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Center,3 reaching the same result as the Canadian court.
Specifically, both courts ultimately privileged the right of access to
abortion clinics over the right to free religious expression. But,
interestingly, the reasoning deployed in reaching these parallel
conclusions was conspicuously different.
What is significant about Dieleman is that the right to privacy
and the right to free religious expression took center stage in the
Canadian court's opinion. This stands in acute contrast to the
American decision, in which the Madsen Court appears to have
constrained itself to avoid such a focus. Indeed, the Court limited
itself to ascertaining whether the limitation on protest outside
abortion clinics represented a content-neutral restriction, without
explicitly considering questions of privacy or religious freedom. In
the pages to follow, I will illustrate that Dieleman is a uniquely
Canadian decision, for it differs sharply from the corresponding
American jurisprudence.
It is worth noting that Canadian jurists often call upon
American legal pronouncements to inform their judgments.
Indeed, this has been the case in such contexts as abortion,5 due
68process, euthanasia,' evidence, free exercise, 9 free speech,1 0
jurisdiction," the political question doctrine, and the right to
counsel.13 It is, therefore, quite peculiar that Canada chose a
markedly divergent course in refereeing the friction between
access and speech. Indeed, it is curious that the Canadian court
expounded on questions left wholly untouched by the U.S.
Supreme Court. This is particularly noteworthy since the timing of
Madsen in relation to the judgment in Dieleman - which followed
Madsen by only two months and, may thus be seen as a
3. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
4. See Gerard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46
ME. L. REV. 211 (1994).
5. See R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 167-71,181-83.
6. See McKinney v. Univ. of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
7. See Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Att'y Gen.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
8. See Mooring v. Canada (Nat'l Parole Bd.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75.
9. R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713,779.
10. See Comm. for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139; R.
v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
11. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Comp. Bd.), [1991 1 S.C.R.
8397.
12. Operation Dismantle, Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
13. R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595, 610, 612.
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"sanitized"' 14 version of Madsen - would otherwise dictate a
different outcome. Both cases arose from similar factual situations.
Yet one court deliberated upon the conflicting rights of abortion
and speech while another gave them no audience. This odd
outcome begs reflection upon the following question: Why did
Canadian jurisprudence command the court to engage Dieleman
with such extraordinary specificity on privacy rights and religious
freedom?
The answer I wish to illuminate centers upon three principal
axes. The first is societal, the second historical, and the third
jurisprudential.
In the period leading up to and closely following Madsen,
there was a palpable sense of alarm in the United States about the
volatility of abortion protest and clinic violence. In a series of
eruptions yet unseen in neighboring Canada, the United States
witnessed a horrific cycle of abortion-related violence that
escalated to crimes of murder. Significantly, the impetus for this
most primitive form of protest was firmly rooted in religion and
religious beliefs. Perhaps recognizing the political dimension of the
anti-abortion tumult, the U.S. Supreme Court was reluctant to
enter the political fray by explicitly invoking a religion-related
justification to sanction or silence abortion protest. This forms the
first reason for the difference between Dieleman and Madsen.
Equally important in accounting for the divergence between
Canada and the United States is the role of religion in Canada.
Specifically, Canada's founding history is unique in that religion
played an integral role in sustaining the constitutional fabric of the
nation. 5 The politicization of religion in Canada has reached such
a heightened plane in the Canadian polity that the judiciary must
14. Some have argued that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
safeguards such liberties as the right to privacy and the freedom of religion, both at issue
in Dieleman, was conceived as a "sanitized" version of the U.S. Bill of Rights, with the
benefit of nearly two centuries of American jurisprudence. See, e.g., F.L. Morton, The
Politics of Rights: What Canadians Should Know About the American Bill of Rights, in
THE CANADIAN AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 107 (Marian C. McKenna ed., 1993).
By analogy to the Canadian Charter and the U.S. Bill of Rights, we should see Dieleman
as a sanitized version of Madsen, since, just as the Charter was drafted with reference to
and after the Bill of Rights, Dieleman was similarly drafted with reference to and after
Madsen. Yet in Dieleman, although the Canadian court had Madsen at its disposal for
guidance in crafting its judgment, the court chose against following its rationale. See
discussion infra at Part IV.
15. See DOUGLAS A. SCHMEISER, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CANADA 63-67 (1964).
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be particularly mindful to tip its hat to religion when the occasion
arises. This was the case in Dieleman. Whereas the Madsen Court
had societal and safety interests at heart when it refrained from
discussing religion in its decision, the Dieleman court had no
choice but to discuss the implications of the religious nature of
abortion protest, given the historically politicized status of religion
in Canada.
A final reason for the difference between Dieleman and
Madsen lies in the then-recent jurisprudential history of Canada.
This last element explains why the Canadian court spent such a
great deal of time focusing on the privacy dimensions of abortion
protest. It had only been six years at the time of Dieleman since
Canada constitutionalized the equivalent protections for abortion
that had been ushered in through the seminal American decision
of Roe v. Wade. 6 The Dieleman decision came at a time when
public debate on questions of life, privacy, and physical autonomy
were reaching their fullest scope. It was therefore politically
critical for the court to reaffirm the important, though admittedly
indeterminate, legal interests of privacy underlying the court's
then-recent abortion rights decision in R. v. Morgentaler.7
Part II will frame the discussion by introducing the delicate
tension between the right of access to abortion clinics and the
freedom of religious expression. Part III will revisit the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Madsen, both contextualizing and
summarizing the decision. Part IV will do the same for Dieleman.
Part V will identify and explain the differences evident between
Canada and the United States in mediating the tenuous conflict of
rights pitting abortion and speech, as gleaned from these two
cases. And Part VI will offer a few concluding observations.
II. CONFLICTING RIGHTS
Though I cannot be certain, I imagine that committed
abortion opponents struggle in deciding how best to express their
disapproval with what they view as legalized murder, and in
identifying the most effective ways of purging an "evil" practice
from the nation. How, they ponder, may I best serve the anti-
abortion movement: Through peaceful or violent protest? What is
most effective in drawing attention to this issue? Will those in
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. [19881 1 S.C.R. 30.
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power take note of nonviolent, quiet sit-ins, or will it take only
revolutionary, aggressive action? These are doubtless some of the
questions that anti-abortionists, young and old, deliberate upon
before charting their course of action.
A. Samuel Lee's Story
In Articles of Faith,18 Cynthia Gorney follows the impassioned
work of Samuel Lee to overturn Roe and to criminalize abortion.
From his days as a young student enrolling in St. Louis University
to prepare for the seminary, to his change of course while en route
to the Missouri state capital where he ultimately established
himself as a pro-life lobbyist, Lee seeks to identify the venue from
which he may best fulfill what he believes to be his life mission.
Lee's chronicled experiences illuminate and personalize an issue
that simultaneously appears to transcend the individual yet,
critically, is also very much rooted in the notion of individuality.
This study - a study of the individual, the rights he possesses and
those he seeks to defend, as well as the beliefs that inform his
sympathies - is the insight that the reader draws in learning about
Lee the individual. But in many ways, Lee's story is illustrative of
the lives of many pro-life advocates.
In seeking to give action to his disapproval of abortion, Lee
pondered how he could be most effective in voicing his message.
At first compelled to enter the ministry,19 Lee abandoned that
calling for a life of pacifist civil disobedience, including sit-ins and
marches at abortion clinics.2z His involvement in this form of
peaceful protest led to several confrontations with law
enforcement and frequent arrest for his continued demonstrations.
"Gotta go out and get arrested today," Lee would say.21
In response to his disruptive protests, abortion clinics sought
injunctive orders restricting his access to and around their
facilities.2 But Lee would deliberately defy these orders and would
not relent.2 3 Ultimately, after committing six separate injunction
18. CYNTHIA GORNEY, ARTICLES OF FAITH: A FRONTLINE HISTORY OF ABORTION
WARS (1998).
19. See id. at 233-36.
20. See id. at 308-11.
21. Id. at 365.
22. Id. at 368.
23. See id. at 368-69.
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violations, Lee was convicted on multiple counts of contempt of
court and sentenced to serve 314 days in prison.
24
But this signaled a moment of reflection in Lee. What good,
asked Lee, is an abortion protestor locked up in jail, and how
effective is martyrdom as a practical matter?2 Lee felt he could
and should be doing more to help stop abortions. He could take
more radical action, like destroying and setting fire to abortion
2 27 2clinics, kidnapping27 or even killing abortion doctors, options he
had never before sensibly contemplated. But he also wanted very
much to raise a family, and realized that the kinds of actions he
was contemplating could land him in jail for much longer than this
one year sentence for violating the court's injunctive order.29 This
choice came at a critical moment in Lee's life.
His options were conceptually sharpened following his
encounters with two men, each representing one of Lee's courses
of action. He knew Andy Puzder, a young lawyer who had
provided legal defense to abortion protestors. Andy had recently
turned his attention to lobbying the state for anti-abortion laws.
Lee was taken with Andy's work, identifying to himself the many
virtues of such a life - no more arrests, continuing commitment to
the anti-abortion cause, lawful and effective contribution to the
public discourse on abortion.32
He set that life in opposition to the life of Randall Terry.33 As
a young, fiery pro-life advocate, Terry developed a strong
following across many states. He urged Christians to defy civil
authority or, as he put it, to "obey God's Word, even if it means
disobeying the ungodly laws of men. 34 Terry led a militant group
called Operation Rescue, whose members believed they sinned as
Christians by allowing abortions to occur among them. "We need
24. GORNEY, supra note 18, at 415.
25. Id. at 368.
26. See id. at 261.
27. See id. at 367.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 418.
30. GORNEY, supra note 18, at 311.
31. Id. at 418-20.
32. See id. at 418, 420-21.
33. See id. at A6.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 462.
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to act like it's murder," Terry would say.36 Operation Rescue's
actions were conspicuously more defiant than those in which Lee
had previously participated, as the group did away with such
ineffective demonstrations as quiet or peaceful sit-ins. Rather, the
group was committed to do whatever it could to advance its
message of life and anti-abortionism. "Very simply," explained
one organizer, "we want to block some doors and save some
babies."37 Lee, after much emotional reflection, ultimately chose
the former course to join Puzder as a lobbyist.
B. Conceptualizing the Tension
Anti-abortion protests pose a number of legal and
constitutional difficulties. In the context of abortion clinics, the
right of anti-abortion protesters to express dissent comes into
direct conflict with the right of women and men to freely enter the
clinics, whether to procure an abortion, seek counsel, or report for
work. Forms of clinic protest include sit-ins, voluntary arrest,
blocking entry, physically restraining entry, arson, kidnap, and
even murder. One scholar chronicles the diversity of such anti-
abortion activities:
Their tactics have included picketing clinics, pelting pregnant
teenagers with plastic replicas of fetuses, harassing clinic
employees, chaining themselves to doors, and lying motionless
in streets and driveways. Some have sought to intimidate
women seeking abortions by setting up sham pregnancy
"counseling" centers. These centers, rather than provide the
counseling they advertise, have traumatized unsuspecting
pregnant women with films of abortions and with films of
abortion and with pro-life literature graphically depicting
aborted fetuses. Such centers have been known to counsel
women falsely that abortion leads to death, disease, insanity,
and sterility. More ominously, some antiabortion activists have
vandalized and even bombed abortion facilities. There has been
a remarkable, although not much-remarked-upon, rise in the
incidence of such antiabortion violence. Since 1977 [to 1990]
extremists in the United States have bombed or set fire to at
36. GORNEY, supra note 18, at 462.
37. Tom Morton, Abortion Foes Taught Protest Tactics, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETrE
TEL., Aug. 27, 1989, at B4, available at 1989 WL 2904022.
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least 117 clinics and threatened 250 others. They have invaded
some 231 clinics and vandalized 224 others.38
While there may be some question as to whether the latter
examples are forms of protest or more accurately viewed as
criminal actions - or as a form of terrorism, as some have argued
39
- it is unclear whether the fanatical protestor discerns any
difference. To him, it is a form of protest firmly grounded in the
right to express oneself. It is his contribution to the pursuit of
higher-ordered justice. This is not to suggest, however, that the
root of such abortion protest is inevitably religious, for it would be
a mistake to dismiss all abortion protestors as "religious nuts.
40
But religious beliefs do significantly inform anti-abortion
activism. 1 Many forms of abortion protest are underscored by a
religious timbre, as many people believe themselves called to such
action to fulfill their religious obligations. Others view these
controversial actions as a means to acquire political capital, which
they may subsequently cash in with elected officials in return for
legislation curtailing abortion. 2 The theory of political capital only
works, however, if a sufficient number of protestors mobilize,
forge groups, and form strong coalitions among these groups. And
this has in fact been the case, for when one group or organization
has been threatened with sanction in response to its abortion
protest activity, the others have often rallied to its defense.43
Indeed, the anti-abortion movement is a close fraternity.
In contrast, abortion clinics, too, have taken steps to advance• 44
their cause in defense of their abortion and property rights. Their
actions, however, are defensive measures, as opposed to the
offensive attacks leveled upon them by anti-abortion groups. The
38. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 171-72 (1990)
(internal citations omitted).
39. John Lynxwiler & Michele Wilson, Abortion Clinic Violence as Terrorism, 11
TERRORISM 263 (1988).
40. Nancy J. White, Abortion: Two Sides of a Controversial Issue, TORONTO STAR,
Oct. 8, 1989, at Al (statement by sociologist studying demographics of pro-life
supporters).
41. See Suzanne Staggenborg, Organizational and Environmental Influences on the
Development of the Pro-Choice Movement, 68 SOC. FORCES 204,222-23 (1989).
42. See David C. Nice, Abortion Clinic Bombings as Political Violence, 32 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 178, 179-80 (1988).
43. DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF
THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: FROM POLITE TO FIERY PROTEST 79 (1994).
44. Clinics Should Use Security, Good Community Ties to Protect Against
Antiabortion Threats, Violence, 18 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 134 (1986).
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measures include tightening security, hiring armed guards,
instituting emergency procedures, developing strong community
ties, and cultivating good working relationships with local
enforcement authorities.4 Abortion providers have also turned to
the legislature, petitioning lawmakers for legislation guaranteeing
safe and unobstructed access to clinics. By 1994, for instance, the
number of states with abortion anti-harassment laws had more
than doubled as a result of effective lobbying.4
These measures helped, but they have not solved the
problem. Although judicially ordered injunctive protection has
itself not ended excessive abortion protest, it is perhaps the most
effective defense that abortion clinics have enlisted to curb both
the frequency and intensity of protest on and around their
premises. Unable to reason with anti-abortion demonstrators who
have harassed their clients and detracted from their business, and
their greater cause, abortion clinics, consistent with liberal
democratic principles, have turned to the judiciary. There,
abortion clinics have secured orders that require protestors, under
threat of sanction, to refrain from demonstrating on the property
and in the vicinity of the abortion clinic. In some instances,
abortion clinics have also secured orders requiring protestors to
stay away from clinic clients and employees, whether they are on
the clinic's premises, on their way to the clinic, or even at home.
These injunctions, however, pose a number of civil liberty
issues. Because protests constitute a form of protected speech,
there exists an exacting standard for issuing an injunction. Given
that the protected speech in question here is often religious in
nature, this high standard is justifiable given the possibility of such
injunctions directly or indirectly suppressing religious expression.
On the other hand, although the First Amendment prohibits
infringements upon speech, it does not immunize every possible49
use of language. As the Court has often declared, the right of free
45. Id.
46. See Terry Sollom, State Actions on Reproductive Health Issues in 1994, 27 FAMILY
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 83,84-85 (1995).
47. See, e.g., New York v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, 273 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2001); see
also United States v. Scott, 958 F.Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1997).
48. See, e.g., Anti-Abortion Group to Protest Doctor, OMAHA WORLD-HEROLD
(NEBRASKA), Oct. 6, 1995, at 15; Jeffrey Kanige, Anti-Picketing Injunction Altered, N.J.
L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at 8.
49. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); accord Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961).
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speech, religious or otherwise, is not an absolute right to speech
without responsibility.0
To justify the suppression of free speech, there must exist
reasonable grounds to fear that serious evil - one against which the
state may lawfully protect51- will arise if the speech in question
continues.52 Within the context of the freedom of assembly,
however, only the gravest abuses endangering primary interests
will give occasion to permissible limitations on free speech. It is
the American tradition to allow the "widest room for discussion,
[and] the narrowest range for its restriction."" But where speech is
so "interlaced with burgeoning violence" - as is so often the case
in abortion protest - "it is not [necessarily] protected by the broad
guaranty of the First Amendment. 5 4 The same is true of speech
that creates an immediate panic or is intended immediately to
provoke violence. 55
It therefore follows that the right to protest or propagandize
is not inalienable, for people do not have the right to engage in
such activity whenever, however, and wherever they please. 6 As a
corollary, no one has the right to im Vose even "good" ideas upon
unwilling recipients of the message. The rule, stated briefly, is
that the Court applies its most exacting scrutiny to regulations that
suppress, disadvantage, or impose dissimilar burdens upon speech
on the basis of its content, while content-neutral regulations are
58subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.
But Americans nevertheless retain the right to be free from
government regulation based on the content of their speech,
because the operative principle for government action is
50. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925).
51. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); see United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (identifying factors to be considered in justifying
limitations on First Amendment freedoms).
52. Am. Comm. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950) (the First Amendment
"requires that one be permitted to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and present
danger that a substantial public evil will result therefrom."); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 262 (1941) (suggesting that "clear and present danger" is an appropriate guide to
determine the constitutionality of restrictions upon expression).
53. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
54. Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
5 11. A AP v C11a;br....rare ..... ,, 458 U.S. 886,97-28 (!982),
56. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,47-48 (1966).
57. Rown v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
58. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1992).
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neutrality.59 When, however, governmental action regulates speech
based on its content, the action must be subjected to exacting
scrutiny to ensure that the speech was not prohibited on the basis
of governmental disapproval or hostility to the speech.6° The
principal inquiry in determining whether a speech restriction is
neutral as to content is the government's purpose for imposing the
limitation on speech.61 Specifically, the question is whether the
government has adopted the restriction because of its
disagreement with the message that the speech conveys.
In the context of protest speech on and around the premises
of abortion clinics, the ultimate question is whether the court-
imposed injunction targets conduct or speech. Anti-abortion
advocates argue that such restrictions are content-based and
detract from the impact of their message. For instance, in response
to injunctions prohibiting protestors from delivering their message
on or around the premises of an abortion clinic, one participant
asks: "Of what use is picketing in front of the wrong building?
Offering a leaflet to someone who is far removed? To do so would
be like addressing an audience with your back towards them or
speaking with a gag over your mouth. 62 In retort, abortion clinic
supporters argue that, quite the contrary, pro-life demonstrators
may indeed speak - just not in a way that hinders the function of
the clinic or the interest of its attendees. In theory, the
demarcation may be clear, but in practice it is admittedly
problematic to ascertain where the line between the two stands.
These are some of the questions that Canada and the United
States have endeavored to resolve. Interestingly, although both
have reached similar conclusions, the manner in which they have
done so bears reflection. The reasoning and legal judgment
Canada deployed in reaching its resolution to these questions has
differed substantially from the reasoning used by U.S. courts. A
closer look at these differing decisions reveals that historical, legal,
59. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67-68 (1976).
60. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-49 (1981);
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980).
61. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989); Cf Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993) ("[T]he First Amendment
forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints at the
expense of others.").
62. Nancy E. Roman, Case Pits Abortion vs. Free Speech, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28,
1994, at A4 (statement by attorney representing pro-life supporter Judy Madsen in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center).
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and socio-political reasons satisfactorily explain this divergence.
Let us consider this fascinating difference between Canada and the
United States by first examining the seminal decisions from each
nation and subsequently illuminating the differences in judgment.
The United States will be examined first.
III. AMERICAN PRACTICE AS STANDARD: A LOOK AT MADSEN
In 1994 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Madsen, in which
anti-abortion protestors challenged the validity of an injunction
restricting the form and manner of their demonstrations. Although
the Court's new test for assessing the constitutionality of a
content-neutral injunction merits some attention,6 3 my principal
occupation is with what the Court did not discuss. In finding the
injunction partly violative of First Amendment protections, the
Court focused primarily on the content-neutrality of the
injunction, rather than squarely addressing issues of privacy and
religious liberty. This is quite peculiar, for these questions were
prominent in the deliberations of a number of antecedent lower
court cases.64
When the Court agreed to hear Madsen, the prevailing
wisdom among pundits was that this case would serve as the basis
for a decision of some considerable magnitude.65 Not since 198866 -
and prior to then, never - had the Court attended to the nascent
tension between the right to abortion access and free expression.
Consider that in the years between 1988 and 1994 when Madsen
was decided, judges in at least twenty-five cities faced this
contentious question yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court:
63. Under Madsen, injunctions "must burden no more speech than necessary to serve
a significant government interest." This is a departure from the Court's previous "standard
time, place, and manner analysis [which] is not sufficiently rigorous." Madsen, 512 U.S. at
765.
64. See Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258 (D.
Kan. 1991), rev'd, 24 F.3d 107, vacated by 25 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 1994); Pursley v. City of
Fayetteville, 628 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Ark. 1986), rev'd, 820 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1987); Welsh
v. Johnson, 508 N.W.2d 212 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Eanes v. Maryland, 569 A.2d 604 (Md.
Ct. App. 1990).
65. See Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court to Decide About Limits on Abortion Protests,
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1994, at A7; Richard Carelli, Supreme Court to Rule on Abortion
Clinic Protest Limits, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 21, 1994, available at 1994 WL 10129823.
66. In 1988, the Supreme Court upheld a Brookfield (WI) ordinance that prohibited
targeted picketing in residential areas. Brookfield had enacted the ordinance in response
to orderly and peaceful picketing outside the residence of a doctor who performed
abortions at clinics in two neighboring towns. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 476-77 (1988).
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When does anti-abortion speech breach the admittedly blurry
boundary between constitutionally protected expression and
illegal harassment? 6 The lower courts tried valiantly to resolve this
thorny issue without much guidance from the Court. At least in
part, this absence of direction sheds light upon the resultant
divergent rulings from lower federal68 and state69 courts on this
conflict of rights.
A. Reviewing the Facts
"We're there on a mission of mercy," 0 implored Judy
Madsen, one of the individuals who contested the validity of
injunctive restrictions that constrained what she believed to be her
right to express moral disagreement with abortion. Along with
dozens of demonstrators from Operation Rescue, Madsen was
arrested for violating the terms of a restraining order prohibiting
various forms of protest activity, including: staging anti-abortion
protest within thirty-six feet of clinic property, approaching
individuals seeking the services of the clinic within 300 feet of the
clinic, and organizing demonstrations within 300 feet of the homes
of clinic personnel.7 Below is a summary of the critical historical
details leading to Madsen's violation of the injunction.
In September 1992, a Florida trial court entered a permanent
injunction restraining Madsen and other anti-abortionists from
blockade activity and interference with public access to the Aware
Woman Center for Choice ("Center"), an abortion clinic in
Melbourne, Florida.72 The restrictions, designed to protect against
physical abuse, extended equally to those entering as well as
67. David G. Savage, Justices to Enter Abortion Clinic's 'Buffer Zone,' L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1994, at A20.
68. Compare Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 710 (11th Cir. 1993) (striking down
injunction prohibiting anti-abortion activists from protesting at and around abortion
clinics), with N. Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1364 (2d Cir. 1989)
(upholding similar injunction).
69. Compare Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 638 A.2d 1260, 1262 (N.J. 1993)
(adopting a narrow view of allowable restrictions imposed on anti-abortion protestors),
with City of Cleveland v. Uveges, Nos. 58498, 59499, 59500, 58501, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS
2272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (advancing more expansive limitations on the rights of anti-
abortion protestors).
70. Joan Biskupic, Limit on Protests at Abortion Clinic Reaches Top Court, WASH.
POST, Apr. 24, 1994, at A13.
71. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759-60.
72. Id.
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exiting the clinic.73 Only half a year later, the Center petitioned the
court to expand the terms of the injunction because the protestors
had not ceased impeding the work of the Center, both directly by
engaging in blockade activity74 and indirectly by discouraging
prospective patients from visiting the Center.75 Because of this and
other unseemly forms of protest activity," the trial court amended
and re-entered a farther-reaching injunction against anti-abortion
demonstrations at and around the Center.
Upon initial consideration, the terms of the court's injunction
7were particularly stifling. But when viewed alongside the scope
and fanaticism of the protest activity the injunction was intended
to curb, it is less problematic to perceive the injunction as
appropriate. Consider the terms of the order: Madsen and others
were (1) barred from entering the Center; (2) prohibited from
engaging in any blockade activity; (3) prohibited from
demonstrating within a thirty-six feet buffer zone of the Center's
entrance; (4) prohibited from singing, chanting, making noise or
broadcasting any images within a patient's sight or hearing
distance in the Center during the morning hours; (5) forbidden
73. Id.
74. The trial court concluded that mass congregation in front of the clinic and
marching in front of the Center's driveway entrance impeded access to the Center. See id.
at 758. There also appeared to be a coordinated effort to distribute anti-abortion literature
to the Center's clients: as vehicles entering the clinic slowed down because of nearby and
advancing protestors, "sidewalk counselors" would approach drivers and passengers
brandishing literature. Id. On occasion, demonstrators numbered into the hundreds, which
produced a great deal of noise in the community. Id.
75. Some potential Center clients were forced to turn away because of the crowd.
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758.
76. The trial court also found that the vigor of demonstrations exacted a measurable
toll upon the Center's patients. For instance, the demonstrations and noise created
increased tension and anxiety among p4tients, thus requiring a higher level of sedation
before surgery. Id. Anti-abortionists also picketed Center personnel at home, identified
Center personnel as "baby killer" in uninvited conversations with personnel neighbors,
and even confronted children of Center personnel. Id. at 759.
77. If we consider the Court's traditional jurisprudence on injunctions upon speech,
the speech restrictions imposed by the Florida trial court upon Madsen and her fellow
anti-abortionists is relatively severe and exceptionally harsh. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976) (reversing federal district court's issuance of a permanent injunction
prohibiting military authorities from interfering with the making of political speeches or
the distribution of leaflets in areas of a military installation open to the general public);
Carroll, 393 U.S. at 181 (reversing state court's issuance of an ex parte 10-day restraining
order against a white supremacist rally); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 504 (1949) (upholding state trial court's injunction of officers and members of a labor
union from picketing appellee's place of business).
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from ever approaching individuals seeking the services of the
Center within 300 feet of the Center absent a clear invitation; (6)
barred from ever protesting within 300 feet of the homes of Center
personnel, and from inhibiting access to their respective homes; (7)
prohibited from physically abusing or intimidating or otherwise
disturbing clients, prospective clients, and personnel entering or
exiting the Center or their homes; and (8) prohibited from
encouraging, counseling, or inciting others to commit any of the
acts forbidden under the injunction.78 On review, the Florida
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's amended injunction. The
court concluded that the forum at issue was a traditionally public
one, and subsequently determined that the injunctive limitations
were content-neutral. This finding commanded the court to
examine whether the speech restrictions were narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest instead of applying the
heightened scrutiny applicable to content-based restrictions, which
requires restrictions narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest.79 The state high court concluded that the restrictions
were sufficiently narrowly tailored so as not to foreclose other
means of non-violent expression.
Madsen herself opposed violent forms of protest, but
nevertheless vehemently challenged the constitutionality of
protest-free zones as unfairly restrictive. Madsen said, "we are
peacefully acting within the law, using our freedom of speech to
say that human life needs to be protected." 8 And peaceful she
was, according to the Supreme Court, as it ultimately invalidated
the speech-restrictive constraints imposed upon her. But as
Madsen and her fellow activists soon learned, American
jurisprudence has "vigorously and forthrightly rejected"," the
assumption that people have a constitutional right to protest
whenever and however and wherever they please. Indeed, as the
Court has previously declared, "the rights of free speech and
assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not
mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may
78. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759-61.
79. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
80. Craig Crawford, Brevard Case May Become Landmark, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Apr. 2, 1994, at A6.
81. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 48.
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address a group at any public place and at any time."82 The
Supreme Court's resolution of Madsen merits further examination.
Madsen came to the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari. The Florida high court had upheld the constitutionality
of the injunction, concluding that the restrictions imposed by the
trial court's order were content-neutral and did not unduly infringe
upon the First Amendment rights of anti-abortion protestors.
Florida's decision was not the sole impetus for the Court's
intervention, however, as the Eleventh Circuit had just presided
over a challenge to the same injunction. Before the state court
issued its opinion upholding the order, the federal appellate court
considered a separate objection to the injunction. But rather than
sustaining the injunction, as the Florida court subsequently did, the
Eleventh Circuit promptly invalidated the injunction. Declaring
that "the clash here is between an actual prohibition of speech and
a potential hindrance to the free exercise of abortion rights, 83 the
federal court framed the balance as between a concretized harm to
expression rights and a possible harm - neither a latent nor
prospective one, according to the Court - to a relatively "new one
stemming from Roe v. Wade."8 The matter was therefore ripe for
a higher authority to settle the split between the Florida Supreme
Court and the Eleventh 
Circuit.
B. Examining the Court's Decision
The Court's decision may be conceived of as eight separate
statements: (1) the injunction imposed upon Madsen was content-
neutral; (2) because injunctions on expression bring a greater
threat to otherwise protected speech, the injunction in Madsen
must be assessed under a more stringent standard than the Court's
customary "time, place, and manner" analysis. This new standard
ought to require that the injunctive order burden no more speech
82. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
83. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711.
84. Id. at 711 (quoting Miss. Women's Med. Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 791 (5th
Cir. 1989)).
85. Interestingly, the Supreme Court announced it would hear Madsen on the same
day that 35,000 anti-abortion activists staged their annual "March for Life" demonstration
uto mark the anniversary of Roe v. Wade, the 1973 case in which a woman's right to choose
was constitutionalized. See David G. Savage, Justices to Rule on Abortion Clinic Protests,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1994, at A25; Mary Deibel, Limits on Abortion Protesters Unfair?,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 22, 1994, at A10; Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
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than necessary to serve a significant government interest; (3)
under the Court's newly-ushered standard, the thirty-six foot
buffer zone around the Center's entrance burdens no more speech
than necessary to safeguard the government's interest in
preserving unfettered access to and from the Center; (4) this buffer
zone, however, may not extend to private property adjoining the
Center, for such a restriction burdens more speech than is
necessary to protect the governmental interest of free access; (5)
also, because noise control is an important interest for medical
facilities, the injunctive noise restrictions are not unnecessary
infringements upon fundamental speech rights; (6) but because the
prohibition on the broadcast of images (i.e., visual signs)
constrains more speech than necessary, this provision must
therefore fail; (7) moreover, the 300-foot no-contact cushion
around the Center for individuals seeking the services of the
Center is too far-reaching an infringement upon speech; and (8)
similarly, the 300-foot no-entry, no-protest zone around the homes
of Center personnel burdens more speech than is necessary to
accomplish the permissible goals of the injunction, which focus
principally upon access to the Center. Each of these statements
will now be examined in detail.
The first question for the Court to settle was whether the
injunction was neutral as to the content and the kind of speech it
was designed to restrict. Three days before the Court issued its
Madsen decision, it struggled to articulate the distinction between
content-neutral and content-based restrictions, writing that
"deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or
content neutral is not always a simple task." 86 The Court explained
that if actions "confer benefits or impose burdens on speech
without reference to the ideas or views expressed [they] are in
most instances content neutral., 87 By contrast, regulations "that by
their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on
the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based."8 8 In
Madsen, the Court exhibited no discernible vacillation on this
question as it had a few days earlier.
Following its earlier reasoning that speech may not be
suppressed "based on hostility - or favoritism - towards the
86. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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underlying message expressed,, 89 the Court found the injunction to
be content-neutral. Although the Court acknowledged that the
form of speech suppressed in Madsen was anti-abortionist in
nature, this result was only incidental. Where restrictions are
"intended to serve purposes unrelated to the content of the
regulated speech, despite their incidental effects on some speakers
but not others," 9 such limitations constitute permissible content-
neutral infringements upon speech. Indeed, "none of the
restrictions imposed by the [trial] court were directed at the
contents of [Madsen's] message," because there is no indication
that "Florida law would not equally restrain similar conduct
directed at a target having nothing to do with abortion." 91 In this
sense, the Court rationalized that "the fact that the injunction in
the present case did not prohibit activities of those demonstrating
in favor of abortion is justly attributable to the lack of any similar
demonstrations by those in favor of abortion."' Moreover, the
Court suggests that the restrictions leveled upon Madsen were
justly adopted "without reference to the content of the regulated
speech." 3
In recognizing that "the constitutional right of free expression
is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as
ours," 94 the Court took great care to stress that an injunction
carries "greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application
than do general ordinances."9  This point is of particular
significance, for the Court adjudged this difference to warrant a
more stringent review of injunctive restrictions upon speech.
Whereas the standard time, place, and manner analysis would
otherwise govern, the Court deemed it necessary in evaluating the
content-neutral injunction in Madsen to fashion a new form of
review, one that ensured the terms of the injunction "burden no
more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest."96 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court identified a
89. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
90. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 122 n.1
(1991).
91. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762-63.
92. Id. at 762.
93. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
94. Cohen v. Caifo.ia, 403 U.S. 5,24 (197i1).
95. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764.
96. Id. at 765.
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number of governmental interests served by the injunction that it
would later go on to uphold.9 7 Among these, the appellate court
listed the interests in protecting a pregnant woman's freedom to
seek lawful medical or counseling services, ensuring public safety
and public order, safeguarding property rights, and assuring
residential privacy.98 The Court endorsed each of these as a
sufficiently significant interest.99 It was therefore under this
intermediate level of scrutiny that the Court proceeded to review
the four corners of the injunction.
A number of factors led the Court to conclude that the 36-
foot buffer zone around the entrance to the Center was a
permissible infringement upon the right to free speech. In addition
to focusing on the narrowness of the confines around the Center
and the picketing activities targeting patients and clinic staff, the
Court declared that the failure of the first injunction to protect
access to the Center and enable an orderly flow of traffic on
nearby streets suggested that the buffer zone was necessary.'00 The
Court insisted, however, that the buffer zone's extension onto
private property impermissibly infringed upon speech because
picketing and other forms of protest on the private property
adjacent to the Center did not inhibit its operation, nor did they
impede access to the Center. °1
With respect to the noise around the Center during hours of
operation, the injunction appropriately provided for control of
excessive noise so as not to interfere with patients during surgery
or in recovery.' ° The injunctive prohibition on images, however,
burdened more speech than necessary because, unlike noise, the
staff may simply pull shut the curtains to conceal bothersome
images.' ° Moreover, absent clear evidence that Madsen's speech is
independently proscribable or is so imbued with violence, the 300-
foot zone around the Center in which anti-abortionists cannot
approach individuals heading to or from the Center burdens more
speech than is necessary to preserve the right of access to the
97. Id. at 767-68.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 768.
100. See id. at 769-70.
101. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 771.
102. See id. at 772.
103. Id. at 773.
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Center.1 4 Although it is true that people may have a right to be
free from undue intimidation, "in public debate our own citizens
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to
provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by
the First Amendment."'10 5
Similarly, the 300-foot buffer zone around the homes of
Center personnel reaches much further than necessary to protect
the privacy people expect in their homes.1°6 Admittedly, "there
simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling
listener,"' but the broad sweep of this provision detracts from too
much otherwise lawful speech. The Court suggested that perhaps a
temporal limitation or a limit on pickets could have achieved the
same result.
This was the extent of the Court's deliberation in Madsen.
The Court dispensed with the case rather promptly, devoting
relatively few pages to its opinion. Having first asserted that the
injunction was content-neutral, the Court proceeded to uphold and
invalidate select elements of the injunction. But the Court did
not give significant attention either to questions of religion, which
was the impetus for the protests, or privacy, which the Center
sought to preserve for its clients.
IV. CANADIAN PRACTICE AS DEVIATION: SURVEYING DIELEMAN
Two months after Madsen, the Ontario court issued its
eagerly anticipated Dieleman decision.' °9 As in Madsen, the major
issue was the constitutionality of an injunctive buffer zone in which
anti-abortionists were barred from engaging in forms of protest
against abortion rights and the right of access to abortion clinics.1
In Dieleman, the Government of Ontario petitioned the court for
an order enjoining all forms of anti-abortion protest occurring
around a number of abortion-related locations, including hospitals,
abortion clinics, offices, and physicians' homes."' Joanne
104. Id. at 774.
105. Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
106. Id. at 775.
107. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485.
108. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753.
109. See Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229,1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *1
110. Differences, however, did exist in the radii of the buffer zones. See id.; Madsen,
512 U.S. at 753.
111. See Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *1.
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Dieleman, a long-time opponent of abortion, invoked her
constitutional freedoms of expression, assembly, and religion in
response to the challenge levied against her demonstrations.
11 2
In its ruling, the court granted the province an injunction
restraining Dieleman from several forms of protest activity,
including picketing, sidewalk counseling, interfering with access to
the clinic, and intimidating clinic visitors and employees.
Specifically, the court imposed twenty-five to sixty-foot buffer
zones around the abortion locations, in addition to 130 to 160-foot
protective radii within which individuals heading toward the clinic
would be safe from unwanted approach or contact. 13 The court
also approved a 500-foot protective zone around the homes of
abortion physicians.14 An examination of the events leading to the
court's decision follows.
A. Reviewing the Facts
Long before 1994, when Ontario filed its case against Joanne
Dieleman, she had established a lengthy history of anti-abortion
involvement. In the late 1980s, Dieleman served as manager of
The Way Inn, a restaurant and pro-life counseling service located
next door to an abortion clinic."5 A mother of eight - including
two disabled adopted children - and a foster parent, Dieleman was
a born-again Christian whose pro-life purpose stemmed not only
from her religious grounding, but from her memories of the Nazi
occupation in her native Holland: "We're living with the gas ovens
now.., but we're getting used to the smell,""16 she once said,
lamentably comparing the Holocaust to the increasing societal
acceptance of abortion.
For Dieleman, life begins at conception, and nothing - not
even rape or incest - can justify abortion.yn In a letter to the editor,
she once explained that "after all, [abortion] does not make a
112. Id. at *18.
113. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *702-03.
114. Id. at *708-09.
115. Pro-Life Group Complains Police Won't Probe Vandalism, TORONTO STAR, Apr.
16, 1988, at A24.
116. White, supra note 40.
117. Judy Steed, There's No Law But There's Still a Fight, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 29,
1992, at D5.
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woman 'not pregnant,' it makes her the mother of a dead baby.'
118
Resolved that her concept of justice would ultimately prevail and
that her demonstrations outside abortion facilities would reveal to
abortionists the light of her model of truth, Dieleman said that "at
times we don't look like we're gaining. But I've read the last
chapter. Eventually, we win.'19
But Dieleman was not only a perpetrator of protest activity;
she had also been a target of pro-choice militants. In response to
an incident in which someone threw a brick through her window,
Dieleman exclaimed, "we're used to this sort of stuff."'2 But
unlike the help extended to vandalized abortion clinics - which
prompted the government to restrict excessive protests -
Dieleman felt that little was done to identify and bring her
assailant to justice. 2' Whether or not her claim had merit,
enforcement authorities surely gave more than sufficient attention
to the clinics' complaints against her. To be sure, the protest
actions of Dieleman and her fellow protestors long remained a
focus of law enforcement officials. Their efforts against her
culminated in 1994, when the Government of Ontario applied for
an injunction to prevent Dieleman and others from blocking access
to clinics, disturbing the peace, intimidating clinic clients, and from
shouting such statements to physicians and clinic employees as,
"Baby killer," "You are going to hell," and "Going in for your
blood money again?'
12
Spearheading the government challenge was then-Attorney
General Marion Boyd. Boyd was a pro-choice advocate whose
department had gone to great lengths to incapacitate the pro-life
movement, having, for instance, hired a publicly funded private
investigator to infiltrate pro-life circles in order to gather
123incriminating evidence. Boyd was a member of the New
118. Joanne Dieleman, Studies Show that Long-Term Remorse After Abortion Is Felt
by Many Women, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 12, 1993, at A26.
119. White, supra note 40.
120. Pro-Life Group Complains Police Won't Probe Vandalism, supra note 115.
121. Id.
122. Tracey Tyler, Are Pro-Life Pickets Homespun or Dangerous?, TORONTO STAR,
Jan. 24, 1994, at Al.
123. See Ontario Sets Out to Crush Pro-Life: A Feminist Attorney-General Sues 18
Demonstrators for Legally Holding Signs, CAN. Bus. & CURRENT AFFAIRS W. REP., Feb.
21, 1994, at 23-24.
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Democratic Party (NDP), which had entered into power in
Ontario in 1990 as a strident warden of abortion rights. 2 In fact,
the NDP had commissioned a consultation group on how to
improve access to abortion services. Coupled with its
recommendation that Ontario immediately improve access to
clinics, the commission urged the NDP to seek an injunction to
halt pro-life demonstrations.12 The work of this consultation group
offered the necessary compulsion for the government's action in
Dieleman, although it is more than likely that the NDP would have
acted to suppress anti-abortionist activity around medical facilities
without this public impetus. 7
In seeking the injunction against Dieleman, the government
invoked a number of interests it sought to preserve, including: (1)
the health and safety of abortion seekers; (2) unimpeded physical
access; (3) medical personnel's freedom from harassment or
intimidation in the course of administering abortions; and (4)
physicians' and their families' freedom from harassment and
intimidation in their private lives.'2 In response to Dieleman's
claim that an injunction restraining her right to protest would1 t 1 - • • 129 • 130
interfere with her freedoms of religion, expression, and
assembly,1 3' as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, the government argued the following.
Principally, the NDP relied on the long-standing notion that
the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter are not
absolute.132 Specifically, the government contended that freedom
123. Andrew Duffy, NDP Urges Access to Abortions, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 14, 1990,
at A3. See Paula Todd, Bob Rae's Year of Trial by Fire, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 6, 1991, at
A23 (noting the government's effort to lobby the Senate on abortion rights).
124. Id.
125. See Morgentaler Proposal Accepted for Ottawa Abortion Clinic, CAN.
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 17, 1994, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library.
126. William Walker, Boost Security for Abortions, Police Are Told, TORONTO STAR,
Dec. 18 1992, at Al.
127. See, e.g., Susan Pigg & Paula Todd, Pro-Choicers Challenge Rae, TORONTO STAR,
Oct. 24, 1990, at A13 (describing the pro-choice movement's mounting pressure on the
government of Ontario); Paula Todd, Ontario Set to Challenge Planned Law on Abortion,
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 24, 1990, at Al (outlining the government's concern with women's
constrained access to abortion services).
128. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *388-89.
129. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 2.
130. Id. at § 2b.
131. Id. at § 2c.
132. See Young v. Young [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, 11 (italics in original).
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of religion was not properly at issue because Dieleman's religion
did not require her to picket as a tenet of her faith.133 Moreover,
the Attorney General argued that freedom of religion does not
extend to activities that harm others, or interfere with or impede
the parallel rights of others. 4 With respect to Dieleman's freedom
of expression claim, the government responded that violent and
threatening forms of speech - like the form of speech Dieleman
had deployed - are not entitled to protection under the
Constitution.'
B. Examining the Court's Decision
"The instant matter," proclaimed the court in Dieleman,
"involves a clash of constitutional values."'36 It did, in fact, involve
a conflict of rights, as the freedom of speech stood squarely before
the constituent rights and freedoms underlying the right to access
abortion clinics. In addressing the merits of the case, the court first
dispensed summarily with NDP's claims of assault,37 trespass and
mischief,138  watching and besetting, 39  stalking, 14°  causing a
disturbance,'41 and other secondary claims. 42 Although this
analysis spanned several pages, the court's substantive deliberation
effectively began with its consideration of the Attorney General's
claim that Dieleman's protest activities constituted an invasion of
143privacy.
The court struggled with the notion of privacy. Although the
court clearly wanted to settle this dispute, at least in part, on
privacy grounds, applicable privacy precedent remained scarce.
Evident in the court's deliberation was a back-and-forth in which
the court would acknowledge the force of the government's
133. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *398.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *487.
137. Id. at *491 (declaring that claims brought under assault were best analyzed in the
context of the doctrine of nuisance).
138. Id. at *492-94 (finding no criminal violation).
139. Id. at *494-502 (declining to address these issues independently of the freedoms of
expression and religion).
140. Id. at *502-03 (declining to consider this claim because the statutory provision
under which it was brought did not exist at the time of the challenged conduct).
141. Id. at *504 (finding no proof that a prima facie violation had been established).
142. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *504-25.
143. Id. at *525-26.
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privacy claim and subsequently reserve judgment as to whether the
claim was in fact meritorious. For instance, the court first appeared
to foreshadow a victory for the government in explaining that
"when the defendants and others shout, scream, speak to and
otherwise communicate with women patients entering an abortion
clinic, they do so with a clear understanding that these women
wish anonymity and may be deterred from seeking an abortion by
an invasion of their privacy."1 " The court recognized that an
unseemly result would follow from Dieleman's actions, but
nevertheless felt constrained from declaring an outright violation
of privacy given that the privacy infringement occurred on public
sidewalks and roadways. The court found that "there is nothing
'private' about the locations where the plaintiff seeks an
injunction.' 14' Trying to supersede the public-private hurdle in
order to grant the NDP's privacy claim, the court turned to tort
law, but concluded that it could not "speak with confidence of a
Canadian tort of invasion of privacy."1" The court continued, "the
concept of privacy is too ambiguous and broad to be able to be
covered adequately in one cause of action.,
147
The court's decision took a turn toward embracing a more
expansive understanding of privacy in noting that "the decision to
have an abortion is a profoundly personal matter. Those
defendants who picket and those who advocate picketing of
abortion facilities are acutely aware that women who attend such
facilities desire privacy. . . .The defendants intend to 'expose'
these decisions as part of a strategy to deter women from carrying
them out."' 48
Having earlier invoked William Prosser's powerfully- 149
influential article, Privacy, which contrasted privacy tort law in
Canada and the United States, the court called upon Edward
Bloustein's response15 ° to Prosser and stressed that the real nature
of a privacy complaint is that the intrusion is demeaning to
144. Id. at *526.
145. Id. at *528.
146. Id. at *529.
147. Id. at *530.
148. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *536-37.
149. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
150. Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
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individuality and an affront to personal dignity."' "When the right
[to privacy] is violated," wrote the court, "she suffers outrage or
affront, not necessarily mental trauma or distress. And, even
where she does undergo anxiety or other symptoms of mental
illness as a result, these consequences themselves flow from the
indignity which has been done to her.'
12
The court then made a calculated jump from privacy
protections to the law of nuisance, declaring that there exists a
"close relationship between existing torts such as nuisance and the
elements of human dignity which give rise to concerns for
individual privacy."'53 The court identifies privacy as an interest
that is protected by law. Thus, "privacy can be accommodated
within an established tort, simply because established torts only
illustrate more general principles as these principles are related to,
though not limited by, a specific family of facts.' 5 4 The court then
made two significant statements: (1) given the close connection in
this context between privacy and expression, an injunction to
safeguard privacy interests cannot issue without a full analysis of
speech rights; and (2) because women's privacy interests in this
context are integrally related to the location and operation of a
medical facility, they are perhaps best accommodated under the
doctrine of private and public nuisance.
C. The Court's Proportionality Analysis
In determining whether or not a nuisance exists, the court
explained that we must reconcile conflicting claims, that is, "the
claim to undisturbed use and the enjoyment of land on the one
hand with the claim to freedom of action on the other." '155 Did the
defendants' actions - which included surrounding patients as they
approached clinics, interfering with or blocking or partially
blocking their entry into the clinic, shouting at them, making
patients feel guilty, shoving literature in patients' faces, waving
placards outside the clinics, thrusting plastic fetuses into the faces
of women trying to enter the clinics, and intimidating clinic
employees - constitute a nuisance? Yes, the court says: "the
151. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 2729, at *538.
152. Id..
153. Id. at *546.
154. Id. at *547.
155. Id. at *552 (quoting REMEDIES IN TORT (Linda D. Rainaldi ed., 1992)).
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evidence reveals a prima facie interference with the reasonable use
and enjoyment of the clinic locations and the homes and offices of
physicians.,1 6 But this did not signal a victory for the NDP, as the
court then turned to weigh the countervailing interests of the
defendants, namely, the freedoms of expression, assembly, and
religion.
With respect to the defendants' claim that an injunction
would violate their freedom of expression under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the court, in recognizing that
"the exercise of speech on a street or in a public park is
fundamentally important, '' 117 concluded that an injunction would in
fact infringe upon their constitutional right. This did not mean,
however, that an injunction could not issue restraining Dieleman's
freedom of expression because, as the court noted, "the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.",
158
Under Section 1 of the Charter, the court must balance
competing values and undertake a proportionality analysis to
determine which right trumps the other. But the court was careful
to note that such an appraisal commands the very highest degree
of judicial caution. The court stated that "the right to freely
express one's views on social and political issues resides at the very
heart of a democracy." Therefore, "restrictions which target social
and political debate ... trigger the foundational nature of freedom
of speech. For this reason, such restrictions demand particular
scrutiny."'5 9 Accordingly, Canada's proportionality analysis merits
further attention.
Section 1 of the Charter, Canada's equivalent to the U.S. Bill
of Rights, provides that the rights and freedoms guaranteed to
Canadians are subject "to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."16° This means that the rights and freedoms set out in the
Charter are not absolute in nature and thus can be lawfully
curtailed or even extinguished. Section 1 contemplates that judicial
156. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229,1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *571.
157. Id. at *608,
158. CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 1.
159. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *615-16.
160. CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 1.
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review of legislation proceeds in two distinct stages: (1) the court
must determine whether the challenged legislation has the effect of
limiting the guaranteed Charter rights, for instance, speech or
religious observation; and (2) if the challenged law does have this
effect, the court must then determine whether this legislatively
imposed limit is a reasonable one that can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society."'
Under Section 1, the government shoulders the onus of
demonstrating the propriety of any limitation upon speech
although, as the court has previously accepted, "not all speech is of
equal value and ... much depends on the particular context.
''6 2
Developed in the leading Charter case, R. v. Oakes,"' Canada's
Section 1 analysis involves a two-pronged inquiry to establish that
a limit upon Charter rights is reasonable and demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
First, the objective served by the measures limiting a Charter
right must be sufficiently important to warrant overriding a
constitutionally protected right or freedom. The standard must be
high in order to ensure that trivial objectives or those discordant
with the principles of a free and democratic society do not gain
protection. At a minimum, an objective must relate to societal
concerns that are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic
society before it can be characterized as sufficiently important.
Second, the party invoking Section 1 must show that the
means are reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves a
form of proportionality involving three important components.
First, the measures must be fair and not arbitrary, carefully
designed to achieve the objective in question and rationally
connected to that objective. Next, the means should impair the
right in question as little as possible. Finally, there must be
proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure and the
objective - the more severe the deleterious effects of a measure,
the more important the objective must be.' 6
But in considering this Section 1 test, an important question
arises: What are the societal values and larger rights that could
161. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 688 (2d ed. 1997).
162. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *619.
163. The Queen v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
164. See id.
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possibly justify infringing upon a fundamental right? Chief Justice
Dickson answered this question in the seminal Oakes case:
The court must be guided by the values and principles essential
to a free and democratic society, which I believe embody, to
name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human
165person, commitment to social justice and equality,
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural
and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in
society.' 66
The court took little time in concluding that the government's
concerns constituted objectives of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding the constitutionally protected freedom of expression.167
These concerns - including the consequences of any delay to
women's access to safe abortion services, the physiological and
psychological health of women, privacy interests of women in
coming to terms with issues of life, death, sexuality, self-image,
relationship, family and future plans, unnecessary humiliation and
embarrassment inflicted upon women, protecting health care
providers from the nuisance created by the defendants, privacy
interests of physicians and their captive families - were sufficient
to resolve the court's analysis of the first prong.
To answer the second prong, the court proceeded to examine
each type of location where the defendants had crossed the bounds
of constitutional expression. With respect to hospitals, the court
found insufficient evidence to constitute unreasonable interference
with their operation; thus, the requirements of the second prong
were not met and no injunction could be lawfully issued. Because
public hospitals are multi-service facilities and people enter
hospitals for a multitude of medical reasons, it is not possible for
protestors to identify, target, and capture abortion patients. 69
165. Note that one justification listed by Dickson is the "inherent dignity of the human
person." Notably, not only is dignity one of several principles that underlies a woman's
right to abortion, but it was the very basis upon which the Dieleman court subordinated
the freedom of religion expression to the right of access to abortion. See Dieleman, 20
O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *694.
166. See Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 136.
167. See Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *643-59.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *656-59.
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Moreover, hospital entrances are often set back from public roads
and streets where protestors are confined.70
However, freestanding abortion clinics are much different
from hospitals in that they often do not have multiple entrances
and their main entrances are often quite close to public streets,
thus placing protestors in close proximity to the buildings and to
attending individuals.' Importantly, because of the specialized
services offered at such clinics, protestors can more easily identify
clients as they enter the buildings. The court wrote that "while the
temporary costs of annoyance or shock in these locations should
usually give way to the more lasting benefits of a broader outlook
obtained from open expression, this general perspective must be
subject to reasonable contextual limitations arising from the
nature of a medical facility and the emotional vulnerability of its
women patients. Moreover, although the interests of free
speech have the greatest weight on a public street, "this important
use of our streets, however, is subject to the protection of public
health and to reasonable limitations consistent with the freedom of
others to receive or not receive the information at issue.'
73
Yet the court was not prepared to issue the 500-foot buffer
zone injunction requested by the government. This, the court
declared, would not impair the protestors' freedom of expression
"as little as possible" as required under Oakes. Indeed, it would
completely silence the protestors, a result wholly unacceptable
under the Charter. Rather, the court reasoned, a smaller buffer
zone ranging from thirty to sixty feet, depending upon the physical
setting of the clinics, would be more appropriate because it would
allow both parties to engage in their constitutionally permissible
activities: public protest, on the one hand, and the procurement of
abortion services, on the otherY.4 The court also created an
additional 100-foot zone within which protestors could not
approach clinic attendants if the latter made it clear that theyS 171
desired no contact. With regard to physicians' offices, the court
established a twenty-five foot buffer zone during business hours,
noting that fewer restrictions were necessary because of their
170. Id. at *656-57.
171. Id. at *659-60.
172. Id. at *666.
173. D ieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.. 2729, at *666.
174. Id. at *666-69.
175. Id. at *670.
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multi-service nature. 176 The court did, however, approve the
government's request for a 500-foot buffer zone around
physicians' residences.1 7  Given that the picketing of a particular
home and a particular family is prima facie a private and public
nuisance 1 8 in contravention of an individual's interest in
residential privacy, an injunction was appropriate. Nevertheless,
homeowners "have no absolute right to privacy [and] focused
picketing is not prima facie justified in these particular
circumstances [because] the doctor, family members and
neighbours are held captive by the picketers in a manner
completely at odds with free expression."'
The court undertook a similar analysis in assessing the
defense of freedom of assembly. Although the injunctions issued
"will violate the defendants' freedom of assembly," the court was
comfortable that such an infringement "constitutes a reasonable
limit in a free and democratic society."'i The defense of freedom
of religion applied to only one defendant, Jane Ubertino.
Ubertino's actions differed from those of the other protestors in
that she did not engage in excited forms of picketing or protest.
Rather, she and a few friends walked down the street on which a
clinic was located and prayed silently for one hour on the first
Friday of each month. They did not stop in front of the clinic, carry
signs, or accost women entering the clinic. Moreover, because the
clinic in front of which they prayed is a medical center that
performs procedures other than abortions, it was not possible for
them to identify and specifically target abortion seekers. The court
properly treated Ubertino independently of the other defendants,
and granted her freedom of religion defense as one falling within
the freedom of conscience. The court reasoned that "if Ubertino's
belief that her protest activity is required by her religion is not
shared by the vast majority of the members of her religion.., it is
difficult to conclude that her conduct constitutes the exercise,
practice or manifestation of her religion., 18' But "this is not to
deny that she is motivated by profound moral considerations.,
18 2
176. Id. at *678-80.
177. Id. at *689.
178. See id. at *688-89.
179. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229,1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *688.
180. Id. at *693.
181. Id. at *697.
182. Id.
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The court therefore subsumed the religion claim into one of
conscience and indemnified Ubertino, thus permitting her to
continue her quiet form of protest.
V. COMPARING MADSEN AND DIELEMAN
Having compared the sharply divergent approaches in
Canada and the United States in resolving a similar constitutional
conflict, the remaining question is why such dissimilarity exists
between continental neighbors? Notably, this dissimilarity is one
of rationale rather than one of result, since both jurisdictions
reached the same decision in principle. The fascinating question is
why the Canadian court chose to eschew custom and decline to
follow American jurisprudential development on this new question
of law involving the tension between abortion and expression
rights. Or more precisely, why did Canada, in Dieleman, engage
the conflict between access to abortion rights and speech with such
specificity on privacy and religious freedom, even as the U.S.
Supreme Court in Madsen chose not to consider these two
elemental rights?
It is quite peculiar that although both Dieleman and Madsen
arrived at similar conclusions, their reasoning was strikingly
different from what the other invoked. Dieleman was decided two
months after Madsen, and thus the Canadian court had the
occasion to review the Madsen decision. Indeed, the Dieleman
court took great care to stress that it had carefully considered the
Madsen decision before reaching its own conclusion." 3 But
although the Dieleman court referred to Madsen, it did not follow
Madsen's rationale. This calculated divergence warrants attention.
Consider the three major features of the decisions: (1) the
buffer zone around abortion facilities in which demonstrations are
prohibited;' 84 (2) the no-approach zone within which individuals
are to be free from harassment, intimidation, and, indeed, all
unwanted contact;" and (3) the home shield in which personal
residences are to be effectively off-limits to picketers. 6 Both
183. Id. at *451.
184. Id. at *659-76.
185. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *670.
186: Compare Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229. 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *689 with Madsen, 512
U.S. at 774 (addressing injunction against picketing or demonstrating near clinic staff
residences).
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187
Dieleman and Madsen approved similar-sized buffer zones,18
although Canada sanctioned both a no-approach zone and a home
shield8 while the United States declined to authorize either of
these.8 9 More importantly, however, is that the Madsen Court did
not find privacy rights to be nearly as important to its decision,' 9°
whereas the Dieleman court found such rights determinative.'91 A
number of reasons help illuminate this inconsistency.
Three reasons for the difference in legal reasoning between
Canada and the United States are societal, historical, and
jurisprudential in nature. First, in the period leading up to and
closely following Madsen, there were increasing incidents of
religion-based abortion protests and clinic violence in the United
States.9' The scourge of violence was particularly shocking as
protestors committed a number of abortion-related murders. 93
Canada did not witness a similar outbreak of violence. 94 In an
effort to avoid adding fuel to the rising fire, the U.S. Supreme
Court refrained from touching upon matters of religion in its
Madsen decision, fearful that any religion-based or religion-related
justification for its conclusion might lead to further violence.9
Second, while the United States avoided the question of religion,
Canada had no choice but to engage questions of religion in
Dieleman because of the constitutionally privileged status of
187. Compare Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *668 (specifying 30-
foot radius buffer zone on the lands on which the clinic is located) with Madsen, 512 U.S.
at 768-71 (upholding 36-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances).
188. Dieleman, at *670, 688-89 (describing personal and residential buffer zones).
189. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 771, 774 (holding that the buffer-zone surrounding the
clinics burdens more speech than necessary and overturning complete injunction on
approaching individuals entering the clinic).
190. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 2729, at *536-38 (providing a
description of the application of privacy rights to a woman's entrance into abortion
facilities in the United States and a Canadian approach).
191. Id. (comparing the application of a woman's privacy rights to enter abortion
facilities in the United States and Canada).
192. See Susan Faludi, The Antiabortion Crusade of Randy Terry: Operation Rescue's
Jailed Leader and His Feminist Roots, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1989, at C1, available at 1989
WL 2006448.
193. See Colleen O'Connor, Abortion Violence No Middle Ground, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 30, 1994, at F1; see also Abortion Doctor Shot by Woman During
Protest at Kansas Clinic, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1993, at A17.
194. E.g., Lewis, [1996] 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 34 (describing rise in protests following the
opening of two abortion clinics after 1988 Canadian decision holding abortion no longer
illegal).
195. See generally Madsen, 512 U.S. 753.
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religion and its politicized character in Canada. 96 And third, the
then-recent jurisprudential history of Canada commanded the
court to give extended audience to questions of privacy,197 which
the Madsen Court refrained from doing. Having recently
enshrined the equivalent protections of the seminal American Roe
decision, Canada stood on unsteady ground, at best, on the issue of
abortion rights. 198 For this reason, the Canadian court viewed
Dieleman as a timely opportunity to bolster Canada's then-
indeterminate privacy protections, as well as the privacy
underpinnings of a woman's right to choose.19 9 Below is a full
examination of these points.
A. Religious-Based Anti-Abortion Violence
A long history of abortion protest exists in the United
States.2°° But the early 1980s appear to have marked a significant
change in the form of discourse deployed by anti-abortion
activists, as violence became a more widespread vehicle through
which to express dissent.2°1 What is significant about these violent
forms of protest is that religious beliefs often stimulated such
aggression.2 2 Impelled by their conviction that abortion and
support for abortion ran counter to their sacred teachings, many
anti-abortion protestors readily turned to violence as the most
effective way of redressing an unacceptable medical practice. 3
This was an ongoing movement during the time leading up to and
following Madsen. Indeed, the murders committed around the
period of Madsen alone reveal that violence continued to be used
as a proxy for speech. Faced with an escalating intensity of anti-
196. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *693-701 (discussing religious
freedom and its application to this case).
197. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 2729, at *536-38 (providing a
description of the application of privacy rights to a woman's entrance into abortion
facilities in the United States and a Canadian approach).
198. Id. at *536 (noting the "difficulty in locating a robust constitutional privacy
doctrine" and the "even greater difficulty in discerning a correlative common law right").
199. See Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 31 (discussing history of abortion in Canadian law).
200. See Virginia Mann, 125 Years Later Time Does Not Heal All Wounds, REC. N.
N.J., Jan. 17, 1988, at Li, available at 1988 WL 5577095.
201. Nice, supra note 42, at 178.
202. Joe Pichirallo & Ruth Marcus, No Conspiracy Seen in Clinic Attacks: Violent
Antiabortionists Share Religious Fervor, Political Naivete, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1985, at Al.
203. See Laura Goldberg, Abortion Doctor Hurt in Kansas Shooting, USA TODAY,
Aug. 20, 1993, at 3A; see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 787 (describing protest signs in front of
abortion clinics).
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abortion violence that was conspicuously laced with religious
underpinnings, the Court had little choice but to approach Madsen
204
with the utmost caution.
In the 1980 Presidential election, anti-abortion activists were
very active in supporting then-candidate Ronald Reagan for office
and targeting a number of abortion supporters in the Senate and
House for defeat.205 In November, pro-lifer Reagan won the
presidential election. And, equally important to anti-abortionists,
four influential abortion adherents lost their seats in the Senate.
206
But although the nature of political mobilization is in most cases a
social virtue and should accordingly be encouraged, the anti-
abortion lobby went far beyond this civil manner of participation.
Indeed, the content of the public discourse on abortion may have
forever changed two years later when the Army of God made
headlines across the nation.2
In August of 1982, Don Anderson and two other men
kidnapped an abortion doctor and his wife. 08 Dr. Hector Zevallos
practiced at the Hope Clinic for Women in Illinois, where he
administered abortions to women who came to him from a number
of states.209 Anderson abducted the Zevalloses from their home on
the pretense of responding to a real estate advertisement, and held
them captive for eight days in an isolated bunker.20 Anderson and
the two men ultimately disclosed their affiliation with the Army of
God, a religious anti-abortion group, and told the Zevalloses that
they had targeted them because of their involvement with abortion
at the Hope Clinic. Under threat of death, Dr. Zevallos complied
with Anderson's order that he record a message to President
Reagan requesting legislation banning abortion. Zevallos was
213
also compelled to promise to never again perform an abortion.
Throughout the weeklong confinement, the captives were
204. See generally Madsen, 512 U.S. 753.
205. Mann, supra note 200, at L1.
206. Birch Bayh (IN), Frank Church (ID), John Culver (IA), and George McGovern
(SD) were defeated. Id.
207. William Schneider, Terrorists and the Issue of Abortion: What Will the Bombers
Achieve?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1985, at 1.
208. United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 1983).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 447-48.
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subjected to spartan conditions and remained in constant fear.214
Although Anderson ultimately released the Zevalloses, Anderson
was sentenced to a total of thirty years in jail.215
Soon thereafter, a number of bomb and arson attacks hit
abortion clinics. 16 After only three recorded attacks on abortion
facilities in 1982 and two in 1983, the number shot up
dramatically.217 In 1984, there were twenty-four such incidents, to
which the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms assigned 500 of its 1,200 agents.218 Among the most
notable in 1984 was an Independence Day bomb placed at the
District of Columbia headquarters of the National Abortion
Federation that, despite failing to detonate, nevertheless caused
the explosion of a propane tank. "These are the latest in a list of
orchestrated acts by common criminals, 22 0 reacted Barbara
Radford, Executive Director of the National Abortion
Federation.22' Despite the increasing frequency of such attacks, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation did not view them as a priority,
which prompted feminists to charge that the Reagan
Administration had failed to move aggressively against the
222perpetrators .
Politicians also entered the fray, as then-Mayor Marion Barry
suggested a link between these bombings and religion: "I'm
outraged," the mayor said. "Now it's a clinic, next time a house, a
synagogue or a church. Those who have a disagreement
philosophically with the abortion issue ought to come out strongly
against [the bombings]. The Jerry Falwells of the world ought to
condemn this type of terrorist activity. ' '223 In response, Falwell
condemned the violence, though he appeared to justify it: "You
214. Anderson, 716 F.2d at 447.
215. Id. at 447-48.
216. See Martin Weil & Lyle V. Harris, Blast Damages SE Building Housing Abortion
Clinic, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1985, at Al.
217. Id.
218. Mann, supra note 200, at Li.
219. Marcia Slacum Greene, Federal Agents Probing Abortion Clinic Attacks, WASH.
POST, July 14, 1984, available at 1984 WL 2027994.
220. Victoria Churchville, Blast Strike 2 Md. Clinics: Family Planning, Abortion
Centers Damaged, WASH. POST, Nov. 20,1984, at Al.
221. Id.
222. Abortion Clinic Bombing Not Considered Terrorism, REC. N. N.J., Dec. 5, 1984, at
A5, available at 1984 WL 2457901.
223. Margaret Engel & Lyle V. Harris, Blast Spurs New Protests: Barry, Falwell Clash
Over Clinic Violence, WASH. POST., Jan. 2, 1985, at Al.
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can understand how a deranged person might do that kind of
thing. But you can't condone it. You can understand when you
realize that what's happening in the back of those abortion clinics
is the mutilation, the destruction of one and a half million little
babies. 224
There was some truth to Barry's assessment of a link between
the clinic violence and its sustaining motivations. Indeed, the
attackers' deep religious views presented a striking unity.2 5 One
commentator observed that the frustration "stems from the fact
that no real progress [had] been made toward recriminalizing
abortion even though the Republican Party [was] committed to
that position and [had] been in control of the White House and
Senate for the last four years., 226 Motivated by anti-abortion fervor
and convinced they were acting "for the glory of God," anti-
abortionists were willing to risk long prison terms to achieve more
immediate results. 27
The connection between clinic violence and religion was
further underscored in 1987 when Dennis Malvasi made headlines
as one of the most sought after suspects.22 A Vietnam veteran who
worked on the Statue of Liberty celebration as a fireworks
technician, Malvasi was a Catholic religious zealot thought to be
responsible for several bombings of Manhattan abortion clinics. 9
Long on the run and pursued by over 300 federal agents and city
officials,23° Malvasi finally turned himself in at the urging of
Cardinal John O'Connor, who delivered a televised plea for
Malvasi to do so.23' In fact, Malvasi called the archdiocese within
232minutes of viewing the Cardinal's address. To special agent
Robert Creighton of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives (ATF), there was no doubt that Malvasi's religious
224. Michelle Coppola, Falwell Calls Abortion Clinic Bombing Terrorism, ASSOC.
PRESS., Jan. 2, 1985, available at 1985 WL 2847194.
225. Pichirallo & Marcus, supra note 202, at Al.
226. Schneider, supra note 207, at 1.
227. Pichirallo & Marcus, supra note 202, at Al.
228. Sandra Widener, 'Zealot' Sought in Clinic Bombings, NEWSDAY, Feb. 20, 1987, at
4.
229. Id.
230. Samuel G. Freedman, Christian Soldier Who Turned Criminal: The Many Faces of
a Man Charged with Bombing Abortion Centers, S.F. CHRON., May 17, 1987, at 3.
231. John J. Goldman, Bomb Suspect Gives Up After Cardinal's Plea, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
25,1987, at 1.
232. Id.
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beliefs played a role in his-abortion clinic violence: "We do believe
there's a religious motivation here, a warped belief.., we have
evidence it's religious conviction. ' '233 And there was indeed a
religious basis, as Malvasi himself declared upon being sentenced
to seven years in prison for his actions: "The cardinal is my
shepherd," said Malvasi. "If he tells me I cannot, that's an order. I
cannot because that would get me in trouble with the Almighty,
and I ain't looking for that." 2-4 By 1989, the increasingly violent
escalation of anti-abortion activity had reached staggering
proportions: 117 clinics had been bombed and set on fire, 224 had
been vandalized, 231 had been raided, and 250 had received bomb
threats.235
Similar incidents occurred between this period and Madsen.236
The motivation often appeared to be religious in nature, as
suggested by the words of Randall Terry, once leader of anti-
abortion group Operation Rescue: "This is not civil disobedience,
it's obedience to God's law., 23 7 Indeed, the anti-abortionist
protesters are, in large part, "self-proclaimed soldiers in God's
army. They come from across the nation to fight an all-out war
between absolute evil and shining righteousness, 238 observed one
writer. But the anti-abortion violence grew much fiercer.239
Certainly, bombs and arson are not exactly victimless crimes,
though when this form of abortion protest is staged at night, when
the clinics have long been deserted, no deaths ensue. Anti-
abortion violence soon extended much further than quasi-
240victimless crimes.
233. Widener, supra note 228, at 4.
234. Abortion-Clinic Bomber Gets Prison Term, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 3, 1987, at
A13.
235. Faludi, supra note 192, at C1.
236. Alissa Rubin, The Abortion Wars Aren't Over: Beyond the Court, Battles over
Access and Restrictions Have Just Begun, WASH. POST Dec. 13, 1992, at C2 (describing
continued protest, violence at abortion clinics).
237. Christopher Scanlan, Enemies of Abortion Take to the Streets, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1988, at Dl.
238. Scott Bronstein & Gustav Niebuhr, Dozens From Across Nation Use Protests as
'Ministry', ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 6, 1988, at B6.
239. See generally Paul Leavitt, Stolen 'Weeping Icon' Returned to Church, USA
TODAY, Dec. 30, 1991, at 3A; see also Abortion Doctor Shot by Woman During Protest at
Kansas C Uln ,U note 193, at A17 (discussing violent murders of two identified
abortion doctors).
240. See Abortion Doctor Shot by Woman During Protest at Kansas Clinic, supra note
193, at A17.
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Around the time of Madsen, there were a number of abortion
clinic related shootings.241 Significantly, a number of them occurred.... 242
in Florida, where Madsen had originated. The first such incident,
243however, occurred outside of Florida. In December 1991, a man
entered a Missouri abortion clinic, demanded to see the doctor on
duty, and subsequently shot and wounded two people,24 paralyzing
one of them.245 The clinic had previously been the site of anti-
246abortion protests.
Less than two years later, the United States witnessed the first
abortion clinic murder.2 47 As Dr. David Gunn arrived for work at
Pensacola Women's Medical Services, he was shot in the back at
close range.248 Gunn had entered the building through the rear
entrance to avoid an abortion protest outside the building's main
entrance.249 The shooter, Michael Griffin, calmly surrendered to
police officers right after the shooting, declaring, "I just shot
someone and he's laying behind the building. 2 0 A resident of
Alabama, Gunn's picture and home phone number had been
featured on posters during an Operation Rescue rally only months
before his death.2 1 Furthermore, only days before Griffin would
take Gunn's life, he had offered a prayer for Gunn at the Whitfield
Assembly of God church. "[H]e asked that the congregation pray,
and asked that we would a ree with him that Dr. Gunn would give
his life to Jesus Christ."2  Griffin, whose car flashes a bumper
sticker proclaiming that "God is Pro-Life, 253 wanted Gunn to
"[s]top doing things the Bible says is wrong and start doing what
241. O'Connor, supra note 193, at 1F.
242. Id.
243. Leavitt, supra note 239, at 3A.
244. Id.
245. O'Connor, supra note 193, at 1F.
246. Two Shot at Clinic, NEWSDAY, Dec. 29, 1991, at 16.
247. O'Connor, supra note 193, at iF.
248. Mimi Hall & Sara Lamb, Doctor Slain at Fla. Abortion Clinic, USA TODAY, Mar.
11, 1993, at 1A.
249. Garry Mitchell, Man Charged in Clinic Slaying Suffered "Great Fits of Violence,"
Wife Says, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 11, 1993, available at 1993 WL 4531237.
250. Hall & Lamb, Doctor Slain at Fla. Abortion Clinic, supra note 248, at 1A.
250. Mimi Hall & Sara Lamb, Abortion Fight Takes Deadly Turn: Violent Tactics on
the Increase, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 1993, at 3A.
251. Id.
252. Rita Ciolli, Protester Slays Abortionist, NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1993, at 4.
253. Phil Long & Martin Merzer, Protester Charged in Death of Doctor, HARRISBURG
PATRIOT, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al, available at 1993 WL 8109994.
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the Bible says was right., 25 4 Held without bond, Griffin informed
the judge of his intentions to represent himself in court, and
requested permission to keep his Bible in jail with him as a legal
document.75' Clearly in shock over the Gunn incident, Eleanor
Smeal, president of the Fund for the Feminist Majority, remarked
that "[t]here is an intensity and a call for violence that I haven't
seen before." 26
In an eerie foreshadowing, Dr. James Todd, executive vice-
president of the American Medical Association, observed of the
Gunn murder: "this deranged act is an alarming example of the
increased level of violence being directed at health care
professionals for political reasons., 257 Only months later, Dr.
George Tiller of Kansas was shot outside an abortion clinic.
5 8
Tiller was the leading abortion doctor in the state, specializing in
late-term abortions.260 As Tiller was sitting in his car in the clinic
driveway, 26' a woman approached him and began firing shots at his
car, striking him twice in the arms. 6' Earlier, the same woman had
been seen handing out anti-abortion literature.2 63 Later identified
as Rachelle Shannon, she was subsequently "indicted by federal
grand juries in both California and Oregon in connection with
attacks on nine abortion clinics in four western states. '' 264 A
member of the anti-abortion group Rescue America, commented
that the shooting "may be a blessing in disguise for Tiller... God
254. Clinic Doctor Fatally Shot During Anti-Abortion Protest, TULSA WORLD, Mar.
11, 1993, at All.
255. Slain Doctor Knew Risks of 'Baby Killer' Stigma, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993,
at Al.
256. Ciolli, supra note 252, at 4.
257. Larry Weintraub, 2 Sides Here Decry Slaying; One Anti-Abortion Group Says It
'Will Not Lament' Shooting, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at 10.
258. Abortion Doctor Shot by Woman During Protest at Kansas Clinic, supra note 193,
at A17.
259. American Political Network, Kansas: Editorials Support Stephan's Challenge, 5
ABORTION REPORT 15 (1993).
260. Id.
261. Michael Bates, Wichita Abortion Doctor Shot, ASSOC. PRESS, Aug. 19, 1993,
available at 1993 WL 4554289; Abortion Doctor Shot by Woman During Protest at Kansas
Clinic, supra note 193, at A17.
262. Id.
264. Jury Seeks Link Among Abortion Clinic Attacks, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 15, 1994, at
24.
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may be giving him another chance to realize the horror of what he
is doing.
2 65
Less than one year later, two men were shot and killed by a
militant anti-abortionist.2  James Barrett, a retired serviceman,
was in the practice of escorting patients and doctors from their cars
into abortion facilities to shield them from protesters. 26' He and his
wife, June, also a retired servicewoman, had beFun volunteering in
this capacity following Gunn's shooting death. 68One morning, as
the Barretts escorted Dr. John Britton to the clinic where he
performed abortions, Reverend Paul Hill shot Dr. Britton in the
head as they pulled into the clinic parking lot,.269 James Barrett
also died and his wife was shot in the shoulder.270
Reverend Hill was a Presbyterian minister in Pensacola from
1984 to 1991, having earned a Master's of Divinity in 1983.27 Hill's
past was littered with the advocacy of violence. For instance, he
had once written in an anti-abortion pamphlet that, "[t]he justice
of using force to defend the unborn is apparent if we don't forget
that the object is to defend unborn babies from a violent death.
2 72
He also believed that "[i]f an abortionist is about to violently take
an innocent person's life, you are entirely morally justified in
trying to prevent him from taking that life.",273 It should come as no
surprise, then, that Hill believed he was serving God by killing Dr.
Britton and James Barrett, who supported the abortionist cause.274
Upon being sentenced to death by electric chair, Hill said as much:
"I know for a fact that I'm going to go to heaven when I die."
' 275
265. Goldberg, supra note 203, at 3A.
266. Couple Pay Dearly for Conviction, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 30, 1994, at 8A.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Sue Landry et al., Anti-Abortion Activist Kills Clinic Doctor, Escort, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 30, 1994, at 1A; see also Couple Pay Dearly for Convictions,
supra note 266, at 8A.
270. Landry, supra note 269, at 1A.
271. James Risen, Shooting Suspect Has Advocated Clinic Violence, L.A. TIMES, July
30, 1994, at Al.
272. Jeff Kunerth, 2 Killed at Pensacola Abortion Clinic, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB.,
July 30, 1994, at Al.
273. Un Militant Anti-A vortement Tue Deux Personnes Devant une Clinique, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, July 29, 1994, available at 1994 WL 9567565.
274. Mark Holmberg, Sentence 1st Under New Law: Two Life Terms Given in Clinic
Access Case, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 3,1994, at A9, available at 1994 WL 7128750.
275. William Booth, Abortion Clinic Slayer Is Sentenced to Death, WASH. POST, Dec.
7, 1994, at Al.
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Shortly after the Hill murders, the federal government
launched a grand jury investigation into the recent anti-abortion
violence, hoping to determine whether the various acts of violence
were in fact linked to each other.27 ' As the investigation got
underway, yet another abortion clinic massacre occurred. This
time, the venue was Brookline, Massachusetts.277 A man entered a
Planned Parenthood clinic, which had been participating in a
nationwide trial of the French abortion pill RU-486,2 8 where he
279
shot and killed a young receptionist and wounded three others.
He then proceeded to the nearby Preterm Health Services clinic,
where he shot and killed another receptionist, and wounded both a
man and woman.28 The total count at the end of the day was
staggering: two dead and five wounded within a matter of
minutes. 2Both clinics had previously been the site of hundreds of
arrests for anti-abortion protest over the past decade.82 Buses
frequently descended upon Brookline, offloading scores of
protestors who engaged in highly orchestrated disruptions,
including a number of incidents in which anti-abortionists would•. • 283
chain themselves to the clinics. When asked to respond to the
killings, Bill Cotter, a member of the Boston Chapter of Operation
Rescue who spent nineteen months in jail for violating injunctions
284
against blocking access to the clinics, said, "[a]s much as I
condemn this action, I do think it's time for Planned Parenthood
and the rest of them to own up to the violence they perpetrate day
276. Pierre Thomas & Bill Miller, U.S. Probes Conspiracy at Clinics, WASH. POST,
Dec. 15, 1994, at A21.
277. Christopher B. Daly, Two Slain at Boston Abortion Clinics: Black-Clad Gunman
Wounds Five Others in Shooting Spree, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 31, 1994, at Al.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Christopher B. Daly, Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 5 in Attack on Abortion Clinics,
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1994, at Al.
281. Daly, supra note 277, at Al.
282. Gunman Kills 2 in Attacks at Abortion Clinics in East, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Dec. 31, 1994, at Al.
283. Elizabeth Mehren & John J. Goldman, 2 Killed, 5 Wounded in Shootings at 2
Abortion Clinics, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at Al.
284. Ronald J. Ostrow & James Risen, 2 Abortion Clinics Were Not Protected by U.S.
A,'rs, a -,,t,..C RO . DeLCV. 1 4YY, at AJ.
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in and day out inside their clinics., 285 And one Reverend
characterized these murders as "justifiable homicide.
' '2 6
These were the fateful circumstances under which the Court
had to decide Madsen. Escalating protests and violence directed
toward abortion clinic employees and attendants - rising even to
murder - were widespread across the United States.2 7 Importantly,
the terror had not been confined to one particular part of the
country, indicating that there was sweeping anti-abortion
sentiment from several admittedly extremist segments of the
community. Nevertheless, much of the bloodshed transpired in
Florida,2 8 where Madsen had originated. It appeared that Florida
was a particularly volatile soil for abortion activity. Indeed, the
whole nation seemed to exhibit such instability. A 1994 survey
conducted by the Feminist Majority Foundation reported that
abortion clinic violence had increased when compared to the
previous year. 89 More than half of clinics reported at least one act
of anti-abortion violence during the first seven months of 1994,
with 52% reporting death threats, stalkings, bombings, invasions,
arson, or blockades. Moreover, 67% also reported other forms of
protest activity, for instance, home picketing, gunfire, or
vandalism.2 91
As Madsen sat on the docket, the Court had to assume both
the role of adjudicator and firefighter. The Court assessed the
merits of the injunction in its role as adjudicator but was also
careful not to further inflame the manifest sentiments of anger
among anti-abortionists.2 9 For instance, not once did the Court
285. Mitchell Zuckoff & Pamela Ferdinand, Anti-Abortion Activists React: Some
Grieve for Victims, Others Focus on Clinics, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 31, 1994, at A18.
286. Ceci Connolly, Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 5 at Abortion Clinics, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at Al.
287. Compare Scanlan, supra note 237, at 1D (describing the activities of Operation
Rescue hosting sit-ins to block abortion clinic entrances), with Schneider, supra note 207,
at 1 (increasing abortion clinic bombings), and Hall & Lamb, Doctor Slain at Fla. Abortion
Clinic, supra note 248, at 1A (shooting of a Florida doctor by Michael Griffin).
288. See generally Hall & Lamb, Doctor Slain at Fla. Abortion Clinic, supra note 248,
at IA; see also Booth, supra note 275, at Al (describing shootings of Florida abortion
clinic doctor).
289. Clinic Survey Shows Slight Increase in Anti-Abortion Violence, ASSOC. PRESS,
Dec. 20, 1994, available at 1994 WL 10113543.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See generally Madsen, 512 U.S. 753 (limiting the holding of the case in weighing
free speech).
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turn to questions of religion or faith. The Court did not consider
the religious underpinnings of the violence perpetrated against
Florida clinics and others across the nation in general, or
specifically against the Melbourne Women's Health Center. The
Court recognized its firefighter role in refraining from touching the
combustible question of religion, thereby reaching a sustainable
compromise acceptable to both anti-abortionists and their
293opponents.
This point is significant, for the opposite occurred in
Dieleman. Although Canada also experienced a troubling rash of
anti-abortion violence,294 this became a reason for the court to
squarely address religion in its deliberation. Therefore, while
religious motivation of anti-abortion violence was a reason to
avoid the question altogether in the Madsen Court's decision, in
Canada the religious motivation of anti-abortion violence was
itself a reason for the court to address the issue in Dieleman.
B. The Constitutional Status of Religion in Canada
A further difference between Canada and the United States
lies in the constitutional status of religion in Canada. Historically
regarded as a source of conflict in both nations,29' religion retains a
privileged standing in the Canadian polity.296 Paradoxically,
although the freedom of religion is deemed a "fundamental
293. See id. (noting lack of discussion of religion in opinion).
294. In January 1992, an abortion clinic was bombed. Jim Wilkes, Fire-Bombing
Suspected in Morgentaler Clinic Fire, TORONTO Star, Jan. 24, 1992, at A7. Dr. Henry
Morgentaler, one of Canada's most prominent abortion doctors, owned the targeted clinic.
The pro-life lobbyist did not seem too distressed by a subsequent bombing in May of 1992
and, in fact, justified the violence in the following terms: "Violence begets violence....
There is no more vicious violence than the abortionists' solution to crisis pregnancies."
Bob Brent, Opposing Sides in Abortion Issue Decry Violence, TORONTO STAR, May 19,
1992, at A6. There was also a highly publicized shooting in 1994, in which an abortion
doctor was shot in his Vancouver home while eating breakfast. Shooting of B.C. Doctor
Sparks Angry Reactions, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 9, 1994, at A21. Dr. Garson Romalis's
home had been regularly picketed. Michael Bernard, Abortion MD Shot at Home,
WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Nov. 9, 1994, available at 1994 WL 15176785.
295. See, e.g., CHURCH AND STATE IN CANADA, 1627-1867: BASIC DOCUMENTS (John
S. Moir ed., 1967); ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1964).
296. See CHURCH AND STATE IN CANADA, 1627-1867: BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra
note 295, Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 47-49 (discussing freedom of conscience and religion
promulgated by section 2(a) of the Charter); see also Zylberberg v. Sudbury Bd. of Educ.,
[1988] 65 O.R.2d 641, 651 (describing affirmative recognition of religious expression in
public schools).
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freedom" in the Canadian Constitution and is preserved in the
Canadian equivalent to the American First Amendment there
exists in Canada a critical exception to the rule of non-
discriminatory enjoyment and exercise of religious liberty.9
To be precise, the Canadian Constitution actually commands
inequitable treatment of religions. 29 Although this constitutionally
sanctioned discrimination extends only to the realm of public
funding for parochial instruction, ° it nevertheless informs the
current discussion of the tension between abortion and speech.
Section 93 of the Canadian Constitution makes special reference
to Catholicism, 1 ensuring that from the founding of Canada
onward, government funds must continue to be issued for
Catholic-based educational instruction, a situation that results in
exclusive public funding for Catholicism.3 2 The original purpose of
Section 93 "[w]as to give the provinces plenary jurisdiction over
education while protecting the religious education of the
Protestant minority in Quebec and the Catholic minority outside
Quebec."30 3
Section 93 and its historical origins lend credence to the view
that a strict separation of church and state was not - and is not -
envisioned in Canada, and that "the advancement of religion is
permissible as long as it does not infringe anyone's religious
freedom."3° This may be in large part due to Canada's embrace of
the salad bowl metaphor 5 - the acceptance, facilitation, and
celebration of diversity - to illustrate its societal objective, as
297. Much like the First Amendment, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
affords similar freedoms of religion, expression, assembly, and of the press. It does not,
however, have an equivalent protection against establishment. See CAN. CONST., pt. I, § 2.
298. See CAN. CONST., pt. I, §7.
299. See id.
300. See CAN. CONST. (The British North American Act, 1867), § 93 (Legislation
respecting Education).
301. Id.
302. In 1867, the Roman Catholic and dissentient Protestant religions were granted
constitutionally enshrined protections for religious instruction under Section 93 of the
British North America Act. Id. But, as Protestant school boards no longer exist in Canada
(having been effectively subsumed by the public educational system), only Roman
Catholic schools remain as denominational schools receiving constitutionally sanctioned
funding from the public purse. See SCHMEISER, supra note 15, at 127.
303. Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Ass'n v. Ont., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470,493-94.
304. Zylberberg, 65 O.R.2d at 674.
305. Peter H. Schuck, Uri and Caroline Bauer Memorial Lecture: The Perceived Values
of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1932-33 (2001) (describing
"melting pot" diversity).
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opposed to the American metaphor of a melting pot, which calls
for general assimilation and adoption of the American way.306
Given that Canada's salad bowl metaphor encourages diversity, it
is unsurprising that the nation would adopt a system that makes it
possible for the state to fund private religious schools and in so
doing, affirms the national aim of celebrating and not stifling
diversity. Indeed, in Canada, "[r]eligion is one of the dominant
aspects of a culture which the Charter is intended to preserve and
enhance. ,
30
Having reviewed the basis for Canada's exception to the
otherwise governing rule of non-discriminatory treatment of
religions, the next consideration is its intersection with the tension
between right of access to abortion facilities and free religious
expression. A recent case, in which a Canadian court assessed the
force of freedom of religion as a defense to a charge of disruptive
protest at an abortion clinic, best illustrates this intersection of
tensions.3 °6
"One of the tests of a free society," declared Justice Saunders
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, "[i]s how it balances the
wish of some to protest or oppose or express dissent with the right
of others to follow their own course., 30 9 Justice Saunders
articulated this standard in R. v. Lewis, a case in which abortion
protestors breached a legislated bubble zone around a
freestanding abortion clinic.3"0 In 1995, British Columbia passed
the Access to Abortion Services Act, which invoked in its
preamble the objectives of access to health care, the preservation
of dignity and the protection of privacy.' The stated purpose of
the Act was to ensure that abortion services were provided in an
atmosphere of security, respect, and privacy by creating a
mandated distance between anti-abortionists and individuals
seeking or providing abortion services.3" The Lewis court
employed the customary proportionality analysis to measure the
306. Id.
307. Zylberberg, 65 O.R.2d at 676.
308. See generally Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 26.
309. See generally id. at 45.
3i. id. at 30.
311. Access to Abortion Services Act, S.B.C., ch.35, §§ 1-14 (1995) (Can.).
312. Id. at pmbl (1995).
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value of religious expression against the liberty to freely enter
1. • . 313
medical centers.
Pro-life advocate Maurice Lewis, then 44,314 had the
distinction of being the first person ever arrested under the Act.3 5
In clear violation of the law, Lewis had defiantly entered the
bubble zone wearing a sandwich board bearing an anti-abortion
slogan. Lewis had acted despite the law's prohibition of "any act of
disapproval or attempted act of disapproval, with respect to issues
related to abortion services, by any means, including, without
limitation, graphic, verbal or written means., 316 In his defense,
Lewis asserted three points: (1) his religious beliefs required him
to communicate his convictions within the boundaries of the
bubble zone and, because the Act prevents him from doing this
constitutionally, the Act is unconstitutional; (2) the terms of the
Act constrained his freedom of expression; and (3) the Act
violated his freedom of assembly.31 7 Only his first claim of freedom
of conscience and religion is relevant here.
It is clear in reading the court's opinion that religion is
afforded the utmost deference.318 Indeed, the court even gives
Lewis what amounts to be the benefit of the doubt with respect to
the substance of his religious beliefs, as Justice Saunders declared
he "[s]hould not inquire into the validity of his conscientiously
held view. 31 9 The reasoning for such a deferential posture toward
religion has been conveyed by former Justice La Forest: Assuming
the sincerity of an asserted religious belief, it was not open to the
court to question its validity. It was sufficient to trigger
constitutional scrutiny if the effect of the impugned act or
provision interfered with an individual's' religious activities or
convictions.32 ° In other words, it is enough that Lewis sincerely
held the views he professed to accept as true, and believed his
form of protest to be in accordance with and mandated by his
religious beliefs.
313. Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 30.
314. Abortion Protest Ban Overturned, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 24, 1996, at A8.
315. Southam Bus. Communications, Inc., Man Arrested for Wearing Anti-Abortion
Sign in Bubble Around BC Clinic, CANADIAN OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY
NEWS, Oct. 2, 1995.
316. Access to Abortion Services Act, S.B.C., ch.35, §§ 1-2 (1995) (Can.).
317. Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 47-50.
318. Id. at 47-49.
319. Id. at 48.
320. R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, 295.
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Given this relaxed judicial standard for determining whether
a belief is in fact a religious one, the court left itself no choice but
to take the subsequent step to declare that the Act violated the
Charter's protections of fundamental freedoms under Section 2.321
It was clear to the court that the Act exacted a patent intrusion
upon the right of Lewis and others to free religious exercise. 322 In
fact, the court affirmed that "the Act infringe[s] Lewis' freedom of
conscience and religion by limiting his ability to manifest his
conscientiously held, religiously based views at the place he
considers most effective for their communication., 323 But, although
the Act constrained Lewis's freedom of religion and religious
expression, it was nevertheless necessary for the court to consider
the impact of the Act on Lewis's rights "in comparison to the
objective of those provisions of the Act and the good to which they
are directed., 324 Once again, the court undertook its Section 1
proportionality analysis to mediate this tension.3z2
Recall the proportionality inquiry under Section 1. In this
context, the court must consider whether the infringement of the
fundamental right to free religious expression under the Access to
Abortion Services Act is a reasonable limit that can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.326 The test,
321referred to as the Oakes test, counts two prongs. First, the court
must ask whether the objective served by the Act relates to
pressing and substantial concerns. 28 Second, the court must
examine whether the measures are proportionally sensible,
meaning that they must be fair and reasonably related to their
objective, they must impair the constrained freedom as little as
possible, and their effect must be proportional to the salutary
effect of the law.329
In the first inquiry, the court established that the objectives of
the Act-to facilitate access to abortion services and to ensure the
safety of both attendants and employees-were firmly and
321. Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 49.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 64.
326. Id. at 50.
3247. Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 57.
328. Id. at 51.
329. Id.
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properly rooted in the legislature's substantial concern about the
"invasion of privacy of the women seeking to avail themselves of
the health care provided at the clinic.",330 Therefore, the court
wrote, there was "no doubt that the objective of equal access to
abortion services, enhanced privacy and dignity for women making
use of the services and improved climate and security for service
providers is a sufficiently important objective to pass the first
Oakes test.
3 31
In the second inquiry, the court declared that the measures of
the Act were rationally connected to their objective.332 Because the
protest activity "clearly invades the privacy of women and those
escorting them," '333 and because "harsh and condemnatory
messages communicated by sign, pamphlet and orally, have been
delivered with resulting stress to an audience which can only avoid
the message by declining the medical service provided by the
clinic, ,"31 the provisions constraining free religious expression were
rationally connected to the objectives of the Act. The second
prong also commanded a showing that the provisions impaired
Lewis's rights as little as possible.3 Since the size of the restricted
area was "reasonable to provide a quiet space with privacy and
dignity for the users of the clinic," and since a reduction of the
bubble zone "would not significantly enhance the expression of the
protesters, 336 the court found the access zones to be in the range
of least intrusive legislative responses necessary to achieve the
Act's objectives. 337 The final test-proportionality-gave the court
a little more pause.
Given that freedom of expression has high value in a
democracy, the court acknowledged, "the very lifeblood of
democracy is the free exchange of ideas and opinions. '338
Moreover, "in a free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a
diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the
330. Id. at 54, 56.
331. Id. at 57.
332. Id. at 58-59.
333. Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 58.
334. Id. at 59.
335. Id. at 62.
336. Id. at 63.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 65 (quoting R. v. Kopyto, [1987] 47 D.L.R. (4th) 213, 216).
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community and to the individual." '339 But, "a person who is in a
public place for the purpose of expressing himself must respect the
functions of the place and cannot in any way invoke his or her
freedom of expression so as to interfere with those functions."
3 40
Consequently, because Lewis is not barred from expressive activity
outside the access zone, he is not condemned to silence: "[A]s
significant as freedom of expression is and as sincere and
impassioned as the views of Mr. Lewis or other protesters are, this
case does not present an example of that freedom at its highest
value. 3 41 Because privacy for those using the facility should be
impaired as little as possible, and because "not the least of the
privacy interests adversely affected by the protest activity is a loss
of repose from unwanted intrusion,, 342 a woman's right to access
health care without unnecessary loss of privacy and dignity
"outweighs the infringement of section 2 of the Charter, 3 43 which
safeguards religious expression. Therefore, the court concluded
that the Access to Abortion Services Act was demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society, such that religious
expression had to take a back seat to privacy rights. The court's
conclusion may be best captured as follows:
While non-violent and passive expression of disapproval falls
within this Act, the evidence establishes that such activity, in
the context of the well-known history of vigorous protest and
the vulnerable nature of many of those who enter the clinic, is
contrary to the well being, privacy and dignity of those using the
344clinic's services.
Though the court's proportionality analysis ultimately
declared privacy interests more compelling than religious
expression, it is important to recognize that the court could have
reached the same result without spilling so much ink on Lewis's
right to free religious expression. Indeed, the court was
constrained neither by the Constitution nor by jurisprudential
precedent to extend such deference to Lewis's religious beliefs.
339. Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 65 (quoting Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Que. (Att'y Gen.), [1989]
39 C.R.R. 193, 228).
340. Id. at 66 (quoting Comm. for the Commonwealth of Can. v. Canada, [1991] 1
S.C.R. 139, 156-57).
341. Id. at 67.
.,L. U. at 00.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 58-59.
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Rather, the politicized nature of religion in Canada prompted the
court to consider such questions.
The privileged status of religion in Canada commanded the
court to declare that the buffer zone infringed Lewis's right to free
religious expression. While the religious diversification in the
United States is likely similar to that in Canada, the difference lies
in the constitutional protection afforded to religion beyond the
obligatory free exercise protections. In Canada, as in the United
States, religious protections exist in the form of both free exercise
and free speech incarnations.345 Yet, as outlined above in the
historical development of Canada, the critical divergence is that
Canada's Constitution is in fact partial towards Catholicism and
Catholic religious instruction.3 This constitutional Trovision is, of
course, but an artifact of the Canadian experience. Nevertheless,
it exacts a discernible impression upon other segments of the
Canadian polity, namely the right to privacy.
Consider, for instance, Canada's Privacy Act. Administered
under the aegis of a Privacy Commissioner, the Act represents
Canada's effort to safeguard matters deemed private. Significantly,
the Act protects one's religion as personal information beyond the
reach of others.349 This suggests that, as a legislative matter,
religion occupies a delicate sphere among the Canadian populace.
This has extended to the judiciary, where judicial pronouncements
have acknowledged the great care with which religion ought to be
examined.350 Matters pertaining to religion "are, and have been
recognized in our multiplicity of cultures, to be of very private
concern."35' As one jurist has written, "[i]n my view, state-
sponsored inquiries into any person's religion should be avoided
wherever reasonably possible, since they expose an individual's
345. Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 47-50; see also CAN. CONST., pt. I., § 2 (fundamental
freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of communication; freedom of peaceful
assembly; and freedom of association).
346. CAN. CONST. (The British North American Act, 1867), § 93(1) (Legislation
respecting Education).
347. For a historical review of this constitutional provision, see Zylberberg, 65 O.R.2d
at 648-52.
348. For a brief, but thorough, review of the role of Canada's Privacy Commissioner,
see Jonathan M. Winter, Regulating the Free Flow of Information: A Privacy Czar as the
Ultimate Big Brother, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37, 53-59 (2000).
349. Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P-21, §§ 2-3 (1985).
350. Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 48; see also Jones, 2 S.C.R. at 294-95.
351. R.v. Otto, [1984116 C.C.C.3d 289, 308.
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most personal and private beliefs to public airing and testing in a
judicial or quasi-judicial setting., 35 2 This is wholly consistent with
the treatment of religion in Lewis, where the court was constrained
to tip its hat to religion even though, ultimately, the societal
privacy interests of women-and the consequent right of access to
abortion clinics -necessarily trumped the right to free religious
expression.353
The imperative need for privacy interests to supersede the
right to free religious expression in Canada leads to a third reason
why Canada and the United States decided Dieleman and Madsen
on different legal bases.
C. The Politics of Abortion
Perhaps the decisive reason the Canadian court decided
Dieleman on privacy grounds, while the U.S. Supreme Court did
not give privacy interests much consideration in Madsen, may be
traced to the contemporaneous jurisprudential and political history
of privacy in Canada. Specifically, the Canadian case Morgentaler,
the equivalent to the seminal 1973 American case Roe v. Wade,
3 54
did not emerge until 1988. Thus, abortion as a right rooted in some
measure of privacy and personal autonomy appeared in Canada
some fifteen years later than it did in the United States. And
Dieleman was decided but six years afterward in 1994.15' Both this
short intervening six-year period and the need to reaffirm the
enunciation of women's personal autonomy rights as they relate to
abortion explains, in part, why the Canadian court was constrained
to decide Dieleman as it did, focusing keenly upon privacy rights.
Importantly, the Canadian court did so for both legal and political
reasons. Before examining these reasons, Canada's version of Roe
merits consideration.
1. R. v. Morgentaler
In 1988, R. v. Morgentaler was decided by a margin of five to
two.35 6 For purposes of this article, Morgentaler stands for the
proposition that state interference with the bodily integrity of a
352. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., 2 S.C.R. at 779.
353. Lewis, 39 C.R.R. (2d) at 68.
3J4. 410 U.S. 113.
355. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *1.
356. Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 32.
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woman in the context of abortion constitutes an unjustifiable
breach of security of the person under the Canadian Charter.
357
Moreover, the state may not interfere, by either imposing or
threatening criminal sanction, with a woman's decision to carry a
fetus to term.358 Throughout Dieleman, the court frequently
referred to Morgentaler, suggesting if not explicitly indicating, that
Morgentaler would hold determinative weight upon the result.9
The Dieleman court cited Morgentaler at great length, noting, for
instance, that "[n]ot only does the removal of decision-making
power threaten women in a physical sense; the indecision of
knowin& whether an abortion will be granted inflicts emotional
stress." Equally important was a concurrence in Morgentaler,
which served as a basis for the Dieleman court to declare that the
right to terminate a pregnancy is a safeguarded right to liberty. In
turn, this safeguard guaranteed a degree of personal autonomy
over important decisions extending to people's private lives.36'
The Dieleman court's discussion of privacy was peculiarly
reminiscent of Morgentaler. In assessing the governmental purpose
behind the injunction sought by the Government of Ontario, the
court discussed the relationship between abortion and the physical
and emotional well being of women.362 Citing Morgentaler, the
court proclaimed that "beliefs about human worth and dignity are
the sine qua non of the political tradition underlying the
Charter., 363 The court moreover adopted the well-reasoned
intervention of the Morgentaler concurrence, which stated that
abortion is a decision "that will have profound psychological,
economic and social consequences for the pregnant woman.
364
Therefore, reasoned the court, if this is the case for abortion, it
must necessarily also apply to the act of physically traveling to the
abortion clinic. 65 Because, indeed, the government's concern for
357. CAN. CONST., pt. I, § 7 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.").
358. Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 32-33.
359. E.g., Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *390.
360. Id. at 280 (quoting Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 56-57).
361. Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 36-37.
362. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *645 (describing fundamental
relationships between abortions and the physical and emotional well-being of women).
363. Id. at *645 (quoting Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 171).
364. Id.
365. Id. at *650.
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the physiological and psychological health of women patients does
not disappear in the context of close contact between anti-
abortionists and particularly vulnerable women patients 66 "There
can be no doubt," continued the court, "that [the moment
immediately before these women are to undergo a serious medical
procedure] and this decision constitute one of the most painful and
intimate situations a woman can encounter. 3 67 Having established
the clear connection between the abortion itself, the act of actually
procuring the abortion, and making one's way to the clinic, the
court paved the way for a declaration on the privacy interest
present in the latter situation. The court ultimately did so by
upholding the injunctive relief sought by the government on the
interests of privacy, equality, and public safety.
Although privacy interests were central in Dieleman, they
were not explicitly significant in Morgentaler. In fact, the
Morgentaler court unequivocally declared that it was not basing its
decision on privacy rights but rather on the notion of security of
the person: "It is not necessary in this case to determine whether
the right [to security of the person] extends further, to protect
either interests central to personal autonomy, such as a right to
privacy. .. "68 This poses a glaring quandary, given that Dieleman
invoked and, indeed, relied upon Morgentaler to support women's
rights of privacy and personal autonomy.3 69 Although it does merit
some attention, the question here is not why the Morgentaler court
chose against articulating a privacy interest in abortion. Rather,
the question is how - and why - the Dieleman court could have
possibly relied upon Morgentaler to decide Dieleman on privacy
grounds, particularly given that the Morgentaler court only alluded
to privacy interests as underlying the right to abortion? To answer
this, brief consideration must be given to the post-Morgentaler
period in Canadian politics.
2. The Political Debate on Abortion
Following Morgentaler, the abortion debate had reached its
zenith with fierce debate from both sides. It was clear to the
federal government in power - Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's
366. Id. at *647-52.
367. id. at *648.
368. Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 56.
369. E.g., Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *486-87.
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Progressive-Conservative Party - that the nation was in need of
closure.170 To Mulroney, this closure (if even possible on such a
divisive social and moral question) would have best come in the
form of legislation.371 As a constitutional matter, Mulroney's
inclination was right. For as a parliamentary supremacy, the
federal legislature may, with few exceptions, effectively overrule
the judiciary in saying not only what the law should be and what it
is, but what the constitution holds and requires. This principle has• • • 172
historical beginnings, although today it retains contemporary173 1 74
reach. It may be invoked through the Notwithstanding Clause
of the Charter. Therefore, if the people were repulsed by the result
in Morgentaler - the legality of abortion - then the quick and
constitutional fix was legislation recriminalizing abortion.
Conversely, if Mulroney wished to endorse the court's decision, he
could have done so through legislation. But either way, Canadians
called upon the Mulroney government to take some form of
action.
What followed was a political disaster. The Mulroney
government introduced in the House of Commons legislation that
would prohibit abortions except when a woman's physical, mental,
370. See David Vienneau, Abortion Bill. MP's Ready to Torpedo It Survey Finds,
TORONTO STAR, Nov. 25 1989, at Al.
371. See id.
372. This principle derives from Canada's Commonwealth origins. Similar to the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, which has the power to make or unmake
any law, there are effectively no limits to legislative power in Canada, i.e., the people can
alter any law through ordinary legislative action. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF CANADA 307 (4th ed. 1997).
373. Unlike the American system of governance, under which the decisions of the
Supreme Court are not subject to overrule by the legislature, in Canada the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms permits the legislative branch to enact a law that will override the
civil rights and liberties preserved in the Charter. This override, however, only lasts up to
five years, at which point the legislature must be dissolved for a general election. See id. at
310-11,907-11.
374. CAN. CONST., pt. I, § 33 ("(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may
expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the
Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2
or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. (2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which
a declaration made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would
have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration. (3) A declaration
made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it comes into force or
on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration. (4) Parliament or the
legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under subsection (1). (5)
Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4).").
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or psychological health was threatened,"' thereby effectively
overturning Morgentaler by recriminalizing abortion. A Roman
Catholic, Mulroney said his new bill "will satisfy some and will
render others less satisfied, but it is a matter that has to be dealt
with and we hope to deal with it in a sensitive and thoughtful
way. 3 77 But his political instincts proved wrong, as his proposed
law was quickly condemned by both pro-life and pro-choice
groups, the former lamenting that the law would not go far enough
and the latter decrying the reality that the bill would not guarantee
equal access to abortion in all parts of the nation.378 Specifically,
however, the bill exhibited a number of concerns, including its lack
of delimitation of the terms "mental" or "psychological health.,
379
This prompted several editorials expressing rabid disapproval with
the proposed law.38 0 Not only did it appear that Canadians were
irreparably torn on this issue, but it was clear that elected officials
quite simply wanted to get abortion off the political agenda.3""
Yet Mulroney persevered, sending his proposed law to a
special committee on the support of a majority of the Parliament
members in the House of Commons. 8 Following committee
revisions, the bill was presented to the House for final passage, and
narrowly passed by a vote of 140 to 131, with a number of
abstentions.383 The bill then proceeded to the Senate for approval,
where it met stiff challenge from senators,38 with one senator
pledging his all to defeat the bill.385 Indeed, the bill was not
375. Peter O'Neil, New Bill Would Permit Abortion If Physical, Mental State at Risk,
VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 3, 1989, at A9.
376. Vienneau, supra note 370, at Al.
377. Peter O'Neil, Compromise Bill on Abortion Won't Please All, PM Admits,
VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 3, 1989, at A9.
378. David Vienneau, Both Sides Unhappy with Reported Abortion Bill, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 3, 1989, at A15.
379. David Vienneau, Legislation Would Make Abortions Easy to Obtain, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 4, 1989, at A8.
380. E.g., Editorial, Still Unfair, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 12, 1989, at A8.
381. Geoffrey Stevens, Abortion Law Simply Passes the Buck, TORONTO STAR, Nov.
12, 1989, at B3.
382. 2nd-Reading Win for Abortion Bill Doesn't End Fight, WINDSOR STAR, Nov. 29,
1989, at All.
383. Paul McKeague, Outrage Greets Abortion Law, WINDSOR STAR, May 30, 1990, at
Al.
384. Kim Bolan, New Abortion Law Challenge Expected, VANCOUVER SUN, May 30,
1990, at AL.
385. Senator Vows Campaign Against Abortion Law, WINDSOR STAR, May 29, 1990, at
A10.
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expected to pass the upper chamber 3 6 as only four of the thirty-
eight individuals or groups serving as witnesses expressed support
for the bill during committee hearings . 8  As one commentator
observed, "[f]ar from the 'compromise' it was intended to be, the
bill pleases virtually no one.
' 388
It was perhaps fitting, then, that such a controversial issue
would set a Canadian precedent for creating the first ever tie in the
history of the Senate. Deadlocked at forty-three in a senate of 104
members, Senate procedural rules held that defeat was the result
in the event of a tie.389 Interestingly, both pro-choice and pro-life
advocates celebrated the defeat of the bill. Minister of Justice Kim
Campbell remarked that the closeness of the vote reflected the
divisiveness of abortion in Canada.39
Following the bill's defeat in 1991, a powerful pro-choice
sentiment in the nation emerged.3 91 To be sure, the pro-life lobby
remained in aggressive pursuit of new legislation, as it was
politically concerned about keeping such a conflict-ridden issue at
the fore of their mandate, but its failed abortion bill convinced the
Mulroney government to wash its hands of the abortion debate.3'9
Subsequently, both the Canadian Medical Association and the
Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists stepped up their efforts
to increase access to abortions 39' and noted abortionist Henry
Morgentaler announced that he would open a number of abortion
clinics across the country.394 The government of Ontario also
386. David Vienneau, Abortion Bill Faces Senate Hurdle, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 20,
1991, at B4.
387. David Vienneau, Abortion Bill Nears Final Vote: Condemnation of Proposed Law
Almost Unanimous, Senate Told, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 24, 1991, at A14.
388. William Walker, Tories Could Look Other Way as Senate Kills Abortion Bill,
TORONTO STAR, Jan. 31, 1991, at A2.
389. William Walker, Senate Kills Abortion Bill by a Tie Vote, TORONTO. STAR, Feb.
1, 1991, at Al.
390. Jonathan Ferguson & William Walker, Both Sides Hail Abortion Bill Defeat Pro-
Choice and Pro-Life Groups Stunned, Pleased by Senate Vote, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 1,
1991, at A12.
391. Andrew Duffy, Pro-Lifers Gear Up For New Fight: Abortion Bill's Defeat in
Senate Not End of the Issues, Activists Vow, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 18, 1991, at A15.
392. Lois Sweet, Abortion Issue up to Provinces Now, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 3, 1991, at
B1.
393. Susan Pigg, Doctors to Resume Doing Abortions, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 2, 1991, at
A7.
394. William Walker, Elated Morgentaler to Open Network of Abortion Clinics,
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 2, 1991, at A7.
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entered the picture, proclaiming its plans to publicly fund abortion
clinics and recruit doctors to staff them.9
3. The Legal Result of the Mulroney Government's Failed Bill
What may have been the most important though certainly
least considered consequence of the Mulroney government's failed
bill was the legal result. Canada was left without a law on abortion
three years after the Morgentaler decision.396 As one observer
noted, the bill's defeat in the Senate had "left a void in the law. ' '39
Another remarked that "[a]fter three full years of political
manoeuvering [sic], the unusual status quo dictated by the
Supreme Court's Morgentaler decision remained intact; Canada
still had no abortion law."'3 98 This lack of specificity in the law
exacted a measurable toll on the nation. Canadians had no
guidance as to the popular force of Morgentaler, given that
Parliament, the voice of the people, had failed to successfully
respond to the decision, either by adopting its holding or charting
a different course. Therefore, although Morgentaler had effectively
decriminalized abortion and proclaimed its legality, Canadians
remained uncertain as to Morgentaler's weight absent an offspring
Parliamentary declaration, resolution, or legislation. This is
evident in the distribution of public attitudes in Canada on
abortion between 1988 when Morgentaler was decided, and 1991
when the Mulroney government's flagship legislation for the year
died on the Senate floor.39
Consider that in 1988, 60% of Canadians believed that
abortion should be legal only under certain circumstances, and
only 24% believed that abortion should be legal under all
circumstances.40 The remaining 14% of Canadians held fast to the
rule that abortion should be illegal under all circumstances.4
1
Three years later in 1991, after Morgentaler ushered into the
395. Surge in Abortion Protests Forecast as Federal Bill Dies, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 2,
1991, at A7.
396. Laurie Watson, Canadian Parliament Defeats Proposed Abortion Law, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, Feb. 1, 1991.
397. Duffy, supra note 391, at A15.
398. Janine Brodie, Choice and No Choice in the House, in THE POLITICS OF
ABORTION 57,115 (Janine Brodie et al. eds., 1992).
399. RAYMOND TATALOVICH, THE POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA 111 (Gregory S. Mahler ed., 1997).
400. Id.
401. Id.
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national consciousness a sense of the legal and sociological
righteousness of choice-and during the year Mulroney's abortion
bill succumbed to defeat-the attitudes of Canadians had not
changed. In fact, Canadians had remained unmoved by
Morgentaler, perhaps largely due to the sharpened public
discordance brought about by both the process of legislative
deliberation on the abortion bill and by the bill itself.402 This time,
60% again believed that abortion should be legal only under
certain circumstances, 24% believed it should be legal under all
circumstances, and 14% thought that abortion should be illegal in
all cases.403
From the liberal Canadian standpoint, the problem was clear.
There had been no marked progress since Morgentaler, though the
contrary should have been the case. As the closest Canadian
equivalent to Roe, Morgentaler carried weight only by default.
And this default force existed only because the legislative branch
could not reach majority agreement on the most advisable course
for the nation to take on abortion. The result was truly lamentable,
for through three years of heated political debate on the subject,
the nation made no discernible progress. While there is some
social and political merit to heated public discourse, and while
dissent among the populace is generally a constructive tool for
advancement of and challenge to the existing polity, in Canada the
extended dialogue on abortion regressed as a result of the
impassioned exchange. Granted, the three-year stalemate may
have engaged the nation and its people, but good certainly did not
result from the process, particularly when the status of women and
their right to physical sovereignty was advanced no further than
before. As a consequence, the tie between the abortion rights
established in Morgentaler and the implicit privacy-based
grounding of these rights had yet to be articulated, though it
needed to be done. Dieleman provided a captive forum and a
prime opportunity to do so.
In Dieleman, the court summoned Morgentaler to inform its
decision on whether a woman's right to access abortion clinics
could trump anti-abortionists' right to free religious expression. 4°4
Although the Morgentaler court had explicitly declined to extend
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. E.g., Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. LEXIS, at *39-41.
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its reasoning to create privacy protections and a notion of women's
personal autonomy as relates to abortion, it was clear that these
405considerations had underpinned the Court's decision. Six years
removed from Morgentaler and fewer than three years removed
from the vigorous abortion debate on Parliament Hill, the
Dieleman court deemed it imperative to make explicit precisely
what Morgentaler should have done and what legislators had failed
to do.
By affirming women's privacy interests in seeking and
securing abortion services, the Dieleman court made both a legal
statement and a politically motivated declaration. The legal
statement, of course, was the court's holding.4°6 Beyond the court's
legal conclusion, however, the court took bold steps toward
enshrining privacy as an abortion-related right.4 This is significant
because the court's privacy-grounded declarations were
unnecessary to resolving the legal dispute at hand. As was seen in
Madsen, in which dimensions of privacy were not critical to the
holding,4°8 the Dieleman court could very well have settled the
question without relying upon privacy considerations. Earlier
Canadian cases had actually resolved similar questions without
invoking privacy considerations. One case, for instance, granted
an injunction to enjoin picketing outside doctors' offices.410
Another involved an injunction issued to restrain similar protests
405. Id. at *39 (cataloguing three different decisions forming the majority agreeing
that: (1) Section 287 (then 251) of the Criminal Code infringed a woman's right to security
of the person; (2) the process by which a woman was deprived of that right was not in
accordance with fundamental justice; (3) the state interest in protecting the foetus [sic] was
sufficiently important to justify limiting individual Charter rights at some point; and (4) a
pregnant woman's right to security of the person was infringed more than was required to
achieve the objective of protecting the foetus [sic], and the means were not reasonable).
406. Dieleman, 20 O.R.3d 229, 1994 W.C.B.J. 2729, at *701-10 (holding that application
for interlocutory injunction to enjoin all anti-abortion activity occurring within 500 feet of
hospitals, free-standing abortion clinics, and offices and homes of physicians be allowed in
part).
407. Id. at *651-52 ("The physiological, psychological and privacy interests of women
about to undergo an abortion constitute objectives of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom.") (emphasis added).
40& Madsen, 512 U.S. at 776.
409. See, e.g., Assad v. Cambridge Right to Life, [1989] 69 O.R.2d 598; Canadian
Urban Equities Ltd. v. Direct Action For Life, [1990] 68 D.L.R.4th 109.
410. Assad, 69 O.R.2d at 599.
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outside abortion clinics, 41  and yet another had upheld a similar
injunctive order.412
The significance of these decisions is that they came between
Morgentaler and the Mulroney government's failed legislative
efforts in 1991. That they were decided on non-privacy grounds,
like Madsen, suggests that there is a particular significance to
Dieleman, which came after both Morgentaler and the infamous
Senate tie in 1991. The Dieleman court declined to follow the lead
of previous Canadian decisions and Madsen, choosing instead to
chart its own course. In doing so, the court gave teeth to the
Morgentaler decision, which stopped short of asserting women's
privacy interests in the right to abortion, thereby articulating the
ever-important link between the two related rights. Moreover, the
Dieleman court successfully responded to the failures of the
political actors who had fallen short of the mark.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has primarily reviewed two decisions that address
the tension between the right of access to abortion clinics and the
freedom of religious expression: Madsen, the U.S. Supreme Court
decision, and Dieleman, a Canadian Supreme Court decision. In so
doing, I have endeavored to illuminate how and why the Canadian
decision deviated from the American practice in mediating the
tenuous conflict of rights pitting abortion and speech.
Dieleman focuses at great length upon questions of privacy
and religious freedom, whereas Madsen constrains itself to steer
clear from such a focus. That Dieleman embarked upon such a
different decisional path highlights uniquely Canadian principles
and prudential concerns. Indeed, Dieleman is uniquely Canadian.
Although Canadian jurists often call upon American
jurisprudence to inform their judgments, this was not the case
here. Rather than adopt the American reasoning, Canada deviated
from this practice and fashioned its own, wholly independent legal
reasoning. This is due primarily to societal, historical, and
jurisprudential reasons.
With respect to the societal component, the fateful
circumstances in which the Court decided Madsen required the
Court to delicately refrain from touching upon matters of religion.
411. Canadidn Urban Equities Ltd., 68 D.L.R.4th at 110.
412. R. v. Bridges, [1990] 78 D.LR.4th 530, 535-36.
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The Court instead fashioned a sustainable compromise acceptable
to both anti-abortionists and their opponents, but did so without
touching the combustible question of religion. The Madsen Court
understandably feared that explicitly invoking religion or faith-
based justification-to either give voice to the anti-abortionists by
striking down the injunction or silence them by allowing the
injunction-would exacerbate the existing tension and violence.
Second, the privileged role of religion in Canada was
prominently featured in the Canadian court's choice to carefully
attend to questions of religious freedom. While the American
Court prudently avoided the question of religion, the Canadian
court had to engage questions of religion in Dieleman because of
the constitutionally privileged status of religion and its politicized
character in Canada.
Finally, a third reason for the difference between Dieleman
and Madsen lies in the contemporaneous jurisprudential
development in Canada. Canada did not have a standing law on
abortion, and the court felt compelled to remedy the existing void.
The Dieleman court therefore leapt at the occasion to shape
abortion as a privacy right. This may be seen as a political
imperative. The court chose to give teeth to and bestow a fuller
reach upon the Morgentaler decision, which had stopped short of
asserting women's fundamental, though indeterminate, privacy
interest in the right to abortion.
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